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1 
THE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE: EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF 
(NON)-RELIGION 
[I]t is crucial to realize that the free exercise clause does not protect 
all deeply held beliefs, however “ultimate” their ends or all-
consuming their means. An individual or group may adhere to and 
profess certain political, economic, or social doctrines, perhaps quite 
passionately. The first amendment, though, has not been construed, 
at least as yet, to shelter strongly held ideologies of such a nature, 
however all-encompassing their scope. . . . “[T]o have the protection 
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious 
belief.”1 
The First Amendment provides for specific rules that apply to “religion” 
without defining the term.2 This definition seems essential; the prohibition 
on establishment and the guarantee of free exercise apply by the law’s terms 
to religion,3 and not to anything that is not religion.4 Although Judge Adams 
in the epigraph seems to easily explain the distinction as one between mere 
“strongly held ideologies” on the one hand and “religion” on the other, it is 
not clear that such a distinction is actually possible.5 Black’s Law 
Dictionary, for example, qualifies every factor that it includes in its 
 
 
 1. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1034 (3d. Cir. 1981) (Adams, J.) (quoting Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). 
 2. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879) (“The word ‘religion’ is not defined in 
the Constitution.”). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). 
 4. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (“Only beliefs rooted in religion are 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of 
religion.”); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1352–53 
(2012) (“The Establishment Clause says that Congress cannot pass any law respecting an establishment 
of religion. It does not prohibit the establishment of nonreligious ethical or moral views.”); Steven D. 
Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 
153 (1991) (“[M]ost aspects of [human] freedom receive only generic protection through provisions 
designed to ensure, for example, democratic government and due process of law.”). 
 5. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 825 (2009) (arguing that “choosing among contested conceptions of what is 
religious . . . is contradictory and self-destructive at its very core”); George C. Freeman, The Misguided 
Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1548 (1983) (“[T]he very 
attempt to define ‘religion’ is itself misconceived.”); Jeffry Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The 
Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other 
Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N. D. 
L. REV. 123, 220 (2007) (describing the definition of religion as “a question without an answer” in the 
post-modern world).  
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definition of religion, leaving nothing concrete in the concept.6 Black’s must 
use such a malleable definition because even among core religions—those 
beliefs that are unambiguously religious7—there is significant diversity.8 
When one expands the term beyond that core, the definition may become 
even murkier: some scholars have argued that the title of religion should 
extend to fitness clubs, television shows, or even sports fandoms.9 Despite 
Judge Adams’s conviction, it simply does not appear there is any essence of 
religion, with which a belief becomes religious and without which a belief 
cannot be religious.10  
This difficulty ultimately comes from a seemingly insurmountable 
problem: that “[r]eligion must be special, and yet it is not.”11 The First 
Amendment and various statutes posit religion as meriting special 
treatment, but there does not seem to be any satisfying normative reason for 
that treatment.12 One response is to completely reimagine religious freedom 
and reduce the concept to another theory which does not distinguish 
between religious and non-religious motivations, such as the theory of 
“Equal Liberty” proposed by Professors Eisgruber and Sager.13 Though the 
 
 
 6. Religion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A system of faith and worship 
[usually] involving belief in a supreme being and [usually] containing a moral or ethical code; 
[especially], such a system recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect, or denomination.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 7. A particularly narrow view could cover “solely the five religions that have an extended history 
and an overwhelming global membership—Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism.” 
Robert Bejesky, United States Obligations Under International Law and the Falun Gong v. Jiang Zemin 
Lawsuit: A Justified Reaction to a Threat to Public Security or Genocide? You Decide, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 295, 328 (2005). 
 8. For example, Buddhists are at least arguably non-theistic. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488, 495 n.11 (1961). This alone distinguishes Buddhism from the other core religions. Though even 
within those core religions, such as Christianity, there are sects—Catholics, Calvinists, Unitarians, and 
Lutherans among countless others—all of whom arguably share a god, but differ substantially in their 
conceptions of that god and humanity’s relation to it. 
 9. See Mark Oppenheimer, When Some Turn to Church, Others Go to CrossFit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/28/us/some-turn-to-church-others-to-crossfit.html 
(summarizing academic opinions on groups that might be treated as religions). 
 10. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 1548 (“There simply is no essence of religion, no single 
characteristic or set of characteristics that all religions have in common that makes them religions.”); 
Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 75 (2013) 
(“In American law, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that will make something a 
‘religion.’”). 
 11. Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1353; see also Anthony Ellis, What Is Special About Religion?, 
25 LAW & PHIL. 219 (2006). 
 12. See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1401 (“[R]eligion is not morally distinctive as compared 
with secular doctrines.”). 
 13. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007). “Equal Liberty . . . denies that religion is a constitutional anomaly, a 
category of human experience that demands special benefits and/or necessitates special restrictions.” Id. 
at 6. Instead it “insists on a broad understanding of constitutional liberty generally,” id. at 52, and “a 
robust regime of rights not specifically directed at religion,” id. at 281; see also, e.g., James W. Nickel, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/7
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logic of these positions is in conflict with the plain text of the First 
Amendment,14 this view has become standard, if not even “ho-hum,” among 
legal theorists.15 
Despite the banality of the position among the legal literati, the idea that 
religion does not have special significance has not yet directly made its way 
into constitutional jurisprudence.16 Certainly, religious liberty remains “the 
first freedom” in our Bill of Rights, at least literally, if not metaphorically.17 
That freedom does not stop at the Constitution: a 1992 student Note 
estimated that over two thousand statutes at the state and federal level 
included religious exemptions.18 Repeating that student’s methodology 
today shows a slight uptick in such statutory exemptions to more than 
2,200.19 Chief among those statutes are the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”),20 the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”),21 and their state-level equivalents,22 all of which provide 
religion with generalized special treatment,23 while making only passing 
 
 
Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 942 (2005) (arguing that “religious belief 
and activity are an application area whose content is adequately covered by more general rights and 
liberties”).  
 14. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“[T]he 
text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”); 
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314 (1996) (arguing 
for special treatment of religion “[b]ecause the Constitution says so”); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) (citing “[t]he very text of the 
Constitution” in support of “singling out” religion). 
 15. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139 (2014). 
 16. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (finding it “remarkable” and “untenable” that a church 
would have the same freedom of association claim as a non-religious organization).  
 17. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty The “First Freedom”?, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2000).  
 18. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992). 
 19. The original Note searched “religio! w/20 exempt! or except!” in the Lexis file AllCde. See id. 
at 1445, n.215. Using those same terms on Lexis Advance in “Statutes & Legislation / Codes” returned 
2,763 results on October 10, 2016. This total should be reduced by about 1/5th to 2210 to account for 
the over-inclusiveness of the search. See id. (making this same reduction). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
 22. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-
statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/WR23-SG2N] (listing 21 states that have enacted state RFRAs that 
“echo” the federal RFRA). 
 23. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 42 (2013) (“The 
RFRA laws pervasively single out religion for special treatment in the law. They require courts to 
consider religious (and only religious) accommodation claims, and to grant them unless there is some 
very strong state interest to the contrary.”). RFRA allows a governmental burden on religion to exist 
only if it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(b); see also RLUIPA, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 (same).  
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attempts at definition.24 
Recently the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Seventh 
Circuit have recognized and loosened the tension between religion’s 
potentially undeserved special status and the existing statutory frameworks 
that seek to privilege it, all while preserving these statutes in their entirety.25 
In March for Life v. Burwell,26 the district court found that equal protection 
required that a non-religious organization opposed to abortion have access 
to an existing exemption for religious institutions also opposed to abortion.27 
In its decision, the court relied on a 2014 case from the Seventh Circuit, 
Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk,28 which enjoined the 
state of Indiana from enforcing a law that prohibited a Secular Humanist 
group from solemnizing marriages, but granted a broad exemption for “[a] 
member of the clergy of a religious organization.”29 Both cases centered on 
the understanding that “religiosity ‘cannot be a complete answer’ where . . 
. two groups with a shared attribute are similarly situated ‘in everything 
except a belief in [a] deity.’”30 Thus, the definition of religion and the 
claimant’s31 place within that definition were irrelevant to their entitlement 
to the exemption. Simply put: the courts held that, for the purposes of these 
particular laws, religion was not particularly special. 
Part I of this Note will summarize the facts and holdings of March for 
Life and Center for Inquiry in order to provide a starting point for analyzing 
 
 
 24. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”); RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-2(4) (“[T]he term ‘exercise of religion’ means religious exercise, as defined in [RLUIPA].”); 
see also, e.g., Illinois RFRA, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/5 (2015) (“‘Exercise of religion’ means an act or 
refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is 
compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief.”). 
 25. Even more recently the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has partially 
rejected this holding. See Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419 (M.D. Penn. 2015), appeal 
filed, No. 16-01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 26. 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). 
 27. Id. at 128; see also 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2015), 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A (2015), 
45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2015) (the regulations at issue in the case). This is the same exemption at issue in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) and that returned more recently in Zubik v. 
Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (May 
16, 2016) (per curiam). 
 28. 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 29. IND. CODE §31-11-6-1 (2015). 
 30. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 127 n.8 (quoting Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit 
Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2014)). But see Real Alts., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (emphasizing 
and distinguishing its contrary holding on the phrase “everything except a belief in a deity”). 
 31. Throughout this Note, the term “claimant” will be used to refer generally to the party seeking 
accommodation. A person can request accommodation either as a plaintiff by suing a governmental actor 
or as a defendant by arguing that application of the law against them would infringe on their right to be 
accommodated. See, e.g., RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person . . . may assert [violation of 
RFRA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding . . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/7
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the issue and the solution provided by the two courts.32 Part II will explore 
the modern federal courts’ approach to identifying what makes religion 
distinct from non-religion and some flaws with that approach that are 
alleviated by the equal protection method of March for Life and Center for 
Inquiry. Part III will look towards justifications for religion’s special 
treatment and focus on one possibility that is consistent with the equal 
protection method by not requiring religion to actually be special in order 
to justify the privileged treatment it currently enjoys in the law. Finally, Part 
IV will argue that application of religious exemption statutes to cover claims 
of non-religious sincerely held beliefs, as in March for Life and Center for 
Inquiry, is consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent and that such 
a framework can support rather than detract from the Constitution’s special 
treatment of religion. 
I. THE CASES 
A. March for Life 
March for Life is a non-profit, pro-life organization based in our nation’s  
capital that seeks to overturn Roe v. Wade33 and “defend the unalienable and 
paramount right to life.”34 What it is not, however, is a religious 
organization.35 Despite being non-religious, one would certainly have 
difficulty doubting that March for Life and its employees36 possess a sincere 
belief regarding the immorality of abortion—a belief shared by many 
religious people in America.37  
There exists a process that accommodates employers with similar beliefs 
regarding abortion who offer health insurance to their employees, but who 
do not wish to provide the contraceptive coverage legally mandated by the 
Affordable Care Act38—an accommodation that raises continuing 
 
 
 32. The facts of Real Alternatives are not meaningfully distinguishable from March for Life for the 
purposes of this Note. See Real Alts., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 437. Nor does any difference in facts relate to 
the disparate results, thus the case’s facts will not be discussed in detail, despite its holding’s clear 
relevance. 
 33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to not be legally prevented from obtaining 
an abortion in the first trimester). 
 34. History of the March for Life, MARCH FOR LIFE, http://marchforlife.org/history-of-the-march-
for-life/ [https://perma.cc/95RQ-JASS ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 35. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 123. 
 36. Id. at 123 (“March for Life only hires individuals who oppose all forms of abortion, including 
contraceptives that the organization believes are abortifacients.”). 
 37. For example, the two individual plaintiffs who joined the suit to claim RFRA exemptions from 
the accommodation procedure, see id. at 128–33, are a Catholic and an Evangelical Protestant. Id. at 
123. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (describing the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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controversy before the Supreme Court.39 Per the regulations, this exemption 
is only available to a religious employer or an organization that “opposes 
providing coverage . . . on account of religious objections.”40 The 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided two principal 
justifications for this accommodation to the district court41: first, to “respect 
the religious interests” of the claimants and second, because it only 
minimally undermined the government’s interest in providing 
contraceptives to women who desire them.42 
Because March for Life could not claim a religious exemption under the 
regulations, being a non-religious institution, it instead sought exemption 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.43 The district 
court noted that the “sin quo non [sic] of equal protection is that the 
government must ‘not treat similarly situated individuals differently 
without a rational basis’ for doing so.”44 Even under this rational basis test, 
“the most deferential of lenses,” this regulation failed.45 The court framed 
the question precisely as whether “March for Life is similarly situated with 
regard to the precise attribute selected for accommodation,” as opposed to 
being “‘generally’ similar” to a religious objector.46 Seen through this 
tightly-focused lens, March for Life was not only similarly situated, it was 
identically situated: the two reasons HHS had provided for accommodation 
applied equally well, if not better to March for Life.47 The court found that 
 
 
accommodation process). 
 39. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (extending accommodation, through 
RFRA, to for-profit corporations); Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 
15-119, 15-191, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (May 16, 2016) (per curiam) (remanding the issue of whether 
the accommodation procedure is itself a burden on religious exercise that is not the least restrictive 
means of serving a compelling state interest). 
 40. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a), (b)(1) (2012). Such an organization must furthermore “hold[] itself 
out as a religious organization” or “[have] adopted a resolution . . . establishing that it objects . . . on 
account of the owners’ sincerely held religious beliefs.” 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (b)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 41. Technically these reasons were only given for the religious employer exemption: the broader 
exemption available to non-profits and closely held corporations was not separately justified and in fact 
was originally rejected by HHS. See March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 121–122. 
 42. Id. at 121–22. It only minimally undermined the governmental interest because those who 
receive exemption would be particularly likely to employ people with the same objection to using the 
offered contraceptive services. Id. at 122.  
 43. This clause does not actually exist. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, has been “reverse incorporated” into the Due Process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V, thus allowing equal protection claims against the federal 
government. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).  
 44. March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (quoting Noble v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 194 F.3d 152, 
154 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). 
 45. Id. at 128. “March for Life and exempted religious organizations are not just ‘similarly 
situated,’ they are identically situated.” Id. at 127.  
 46. Id. at 126.  
 47. Id. at 127. March for Life’s employees are all but guaranteed to not use any contraceptives 
offered because “[a]nti-abortion advocacy is March for Life’s sole and central tenet.” Id. For this reason 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/7
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the regulation was in fact not targeted toward religion, despite the phrasing 
of the exemption, but only to a “moral philosophy” that is merely “common 
among religiously-affiliated employers.”48 Because this moral philosophy 
was common to March for Life as well, the exemption had to be extended 
to it.49 Since the decision in August 2015, HHS has filed an appeal with the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.50 
B. Center for Inquiry 
The test used for the equal protection claim in March for Life, with its 
laser-focus on the claimant’s similarity relative to the interest 
accommodated, originated in a Seventh Circuit case, Center for Inquiry, Inc. 
v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk.51 In Center for Inquiry, the Center, along 
with its leader and “certified secular celebrant,”52 Reba Boyd Wooden, 
brought suit under section 198353 to enjoin the enforcement of an Indiana 
law that prohibits the solemnization of a marriage by an individual not on a 
list of exceptions.54 The exceptions include judges, mayors, and clerks of 
the state as well as a general exception for a “member of the clergy of a 
religious organization . . . such as a minister of the gospel, a priest, a bishop, 
an archbishop, or a rabbi.”55 Other exempt individuals include practitioners 
of specifically identified religions that would not fit into that broad 
exemption, including Quakers, German Baptists, Baha’is, Mormons, and 
Muslims.56 The court was quick to note that this list was not all-inclusive, 
even of the plainly religious.57 
 
 
March for Life may be better situated than, for example, Hobby Lobby. As a retail establishment, Hobby 
Lobby has no particular reason to hire only or especially employees with similar beliefs regarding 
abortifacients, and therefore the second justification applies minimally, if at all. 
 48. Id. at 127. The court went further: “it is not the belief or non-belief in God that warrants safe 
harbor . . . . The characteristic that warrants protection . . . is altogether separate from theism.” Id. at 
126−127. But see Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 438 (M.D. Penn. 2015) (“[I]t is not 
by their beliefs that the Departments have elected to differentiate the two. Rather, it is by the foundations 
for those beliefs.”), appeal filed, No. 16-01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 49. See also Real Alts., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (agreeing with the March for Life court that HHS’s 
stance that religious employers were more likely than secular employers to object to contraceptive 
coverage was “simply inaccurate”). 
 50. March for Life v. Burwell, No. 15-5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). 
 51. 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 52. Id. at 871.  
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing legal and equitable relief against any person who, under 
color of law, deprives another person of rights secured by the Constitution). 
 54. IND. CODE § 31-11-11-5 (2015). 
 55. IND. CODE § 31-11-6-1(1). 
 56. Id. § (6)–(10). 
 57. Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 874 (noting that Buddhists, Rastafarians, and Jainists would not 
be accommodated under the law); see also id. at 872 (comparing the statute to one that would “permit 
Catholic priests to solemnize weddings while forbidding Baptist ministers to do so”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Center for Inquiry is a Secular Humanist organization, and its 
members expressly refuse the religious label.58 They do so despite the fact 
that such recognition is freely available to them under the laws of Indiana, 
the Seventh Circuit, and potentially even the Supreme Court.59 The court of 
appeals held emphatically that this refusal of the label did not weaken their 
claim: there was no requirement that the Secular Humanists become 
hypocrites (in their own view) and claim to be both secular and religious 
simply “to jump through some statutory hoop.”60 The court ultimately 
invalidated the law under both the Equal Protection Clause and the First 
Amendment because it was “irrational to allow humanists to solemnize 
marriages if, and only if, they falsely declare that they are a ‘religion.’”61 
The court’s principal holding was that “[a]n accommodation cannot treat 
religions favorably when secular groups are identical with respect to the 
attribute selected for that accommodation.”62 The Supreme Court had 
previously recognized that accommodations could be granted to religions 
without violating either the Equal Protection or Establishment Clauses,63 but 
the Seventh Circuit argued that religion could not be “a complete answer” 
when the plaintiffs were similarly situated in all relevant aspects.64 Although 
“[a] state may accommodate religious views . . . this does not imply an 
ability to favor religions over non-theistic groups that have moral stances 
 
 
 58. See id. at 872 n.† (“The Center . . . refuses to accept the religious organization label or allow 
its members ‘clergy’ status.”). 
 59. See id. at 871 n.† (noting that another Secular Humanist group, the Humanist Society, was 
allowed to solemnize weddings in Indiana as a religion with clergy); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 
678, 683−84 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Establishment Clause requires states to treat atheism as 
favorably as theistic religions); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (including Secular 
Humanism in a list of non-theistic religions in dictum). 
 60. Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 875. 
 61. Id. This Note will focus on the equal protection aspect of the holding, rather than the 
Establishment Clause, though the method is fundamentally the same regardless of the clause invoked. 
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The implementation of 
the neutrality principle of [the Establishment Clause] requires . . . ‘an equal protection mode of 
analysis.’”). The primary reason for this choice is that the Establishment Clause version of the test relies 
heavily on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kaufman, 419 F.3d 678, which may be slightly too strong 
of a holding under the cases discussed infra Part IV.C. Equal protection avoids this potential trap by 
narrowing the standard of review to rational basis rather than some unspecified higher standard under 
the Establishment Clause. Though, to be clear, it is at least possible that a higher standard could be 
appropriate. Cf. Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause 
for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 733 (2008) (arguing 
that it is not “necessarily the case” that an equal protection claim parallel to a First Amendment claim 
must apply a “congruent” standard of review). Regardless, there are advantages to an equal protection 
claim over an Establishment Clause claim. Cf. id. at 701–13 (discussing these advantages in the context 
of government religious expression cases). 
 62. Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872. 
 63. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 64. Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/7
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that are equivalent to theistic ones except for non-belief in God.”65 Because 
Wooden and the Secular Humanists of the Center for Inquiry had all the 
same interests that Indiana sought to accommodate with its broad grant of 
solemnization power to various religions, there was no reason to require the 
label of religion—asking whether Secular Humanism is a religion or not 
simply “misses the point.”66 The court thus granted an injunction, giving 
Wooden’s solemnization legal effect and protecting her from any criminal 
penalties that might apply.67 
II. THE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE 
A. Defining Religion 
Traditionally, any claim for a religious accommodation must begin with 
deciding whether the claimant’s beliefs amount to a religion.68 Both March 
for Life and the Center for Inquiry explicitly claimed to be non-religious—
though such a claim is not always dispositive, even when requesting 
accommodation and the classification can only be advantageous for the 
claimant.69 If the plaintiffs in either case had chosen to frame their objection 
as religiously motivated, it is clear that they would have had their requests 
readily granted.70 Not all claimants can be so lucky; normally a religious 
exemption requires an explicitly religious basis.71 This leaves the difficult 
question of how to distinguish a religious basis from a non-religious basis.72 
 
 
 65. Id. at 873.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 875. 
 68. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 308, 310 (1991) (“Under the exemption analysis, the court must first determine, at a definitional 
level, whether the belief at issue is ‘religious.’”). 
 69. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) (plurality opinion) (arguing that 
acceptance of the plaintiff conscientious objector’s adamant rejection of the religious label “places undue 
emphasis on the registrant’s interpretation of his own beliefs”). 
 70. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (allowing a closely held for-profit 
corporation an exemption for religious belief against abortifacients); Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872 
(“Indiana states that a humanist group could call itself a religion, which would be good enough for the 
state.”).  
 71. See supra note 4 and the epigraph. 
 72. In addition to the cases discussed in this Note, there are countless other cases exploring the 
scope of the term “religion” that may eventually lead to a significant enough circuit split to prompt the 
Supreme Court to step in and provide clearer guidance. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, No. 4:14-CV-
3183, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48746, at *13–19 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2016) (deciding that the plaintiff’s 
professed belief in the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster was not a religion because the church 
was satirical); Hale v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 14-cv-00245-MSK-MJW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132832, at *16–22 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (compiling various district court cases deciding whether 
the Church of the Creator’s “Creativity” faith is a religion and declining to rule dispositively on the 
issue); Sousa v. Wegman, No. 1:11-cv-01754-LJO-MJS (PC), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85208, at *11–12 
(E.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (finding that “traditional Mexican/Aztec/Mayan beliefs” are religious); Heap 
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This question is so difficult, and so dangerous, that a better method may be 
to avoid it completely.73  
Perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court’s strongest analysis on the 
definition of religion did not involve a difficult-to-define group such as the 
Secular Humanists, but a remarkably simple one: the Amish. The Court in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder74 applied a strict compelling interest test to Wisconsin’s 
attempt to convict Amish parents for refusing, on religious grounds, to send 
their teenage children to high school.75 The Court framed the test as one in 
which “only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise 
served” could prevail for the government.76 Despite this extraordinarily 
strong language, the Court noted that the showing of sincerity and centrality 
that the Amish made was “one that probably few other religious groups or 
sects could make,”77 heavily implying the test is not as pro-claimant as it 
appears on its face.78 Furthermore, despite the clear intent to shift the burden 
onto the government to justify its actions,79 the Court relied heavily on the 
Amish’s long history as a religious group and their “excellent record as law-
abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society” to justify the 
exemption.80  
The Yoder Court focused not only on Amish exceptionalism among 
religious groups, but also paved the way for a substantive distinction 
 
 
v. Carter, 112 F. Supp. 3d 402, 438 (E.D. Va. 2015) (rejecting as not clearly established the assertion 
“that Humanism stands on equal footing to religious belief”); Coleman v. Hamilton Cty., 104 F. Supp. 
3d 877, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (upholding policy of legislative prayer led only by clergy members of 
“bona fide[]” religious establishments which either appear in the Yellow Pages under “religious 
institutions” or are eligible for federal tax-exempt status); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. United States, 63 F. 
Supp. 3d 1274, 1286 (D. Or. 2014) (finding clearly established that Secular Humanism is a religion, and 
that the First Amendment demands neutrality between religion and non-religion).  
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1489 (10th Cir. 1996) (Brorby, J., dissenting) 
(“The ability to define religion is the power to deny freedom of religion.”); Eisgruber & Sager, supra 
note 5, at 811 (“[O]nce you say what religion is, you have undone religious liberty.”); Stanley Ingber, 
Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 241 (1989) 
(“The danger in defining religion lies in the possibility of violating the very purpose of the religion 
clauses . . . . To define religion is to limit it.”). 
 74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 75. Id. at 207 (describing the facts of the case). 
 76. Id. at 215. 
 77. Id. at 235–36. 
 78. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 257 (“The compelling state interest test had always 
talked tough but performed feebly.”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990) (“[A]fter [Yoder], the Court rejected every claim 
requesting exemption from burdensome laws or policies to come before it except for those claims 
involving unemployment compensation, which were governed by clear precedent.”). 
 79. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (“[I]t was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how 
its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an 
exemption to the Amish.”). 
 80. Id. at 212–13. 
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between religion and non-religion through an illustration in dictum.81 The 
Amish were the quintessential group deserving of religious accommodation, 
but equally obvious to the Court was Henry David Thoreau’s status as the 
exemplary opinionated man whose beliefs did not “rise to the demands of 
the Religion Clauses.”82 This distinction was based on the assertion that 
“Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious” 
without ever specifying how that determination was made.83 Justice 
Douglas, dissenting from the ruling primarily on the grounds that the Court 
should have focused on the children’s religious beliefs and not those of the 
parents,84 signaled this illustration as a “retreat[]” from earlier Supreme 
Court precedent which would have recognized Thoreau as sufficiently 
religious.85   
 
 
 81. Id. at 216 (“[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and 
rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the 
social values of his time and isolated himself . . . their claims would not rest on a religious basis.”). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 244 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“On this important and vital matter of education, I think 
the children should be entitled to be heard.”). 
 85. Id. at 247–48 (comparing Thoreau with the claimant in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965)). See infra Part IV.D for further discussion of Seeger and its potential consistency with Yoder. 
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B. Yoder in Action 
The Court has not expanded significantly on the definition of religion in 
the intervening four decades since Yoder.86 Instead, the complex task has 
been left to the circuit courts.87 In Africa v. Pennsylvania,88 the Third Circuit 
took the only guidance it had from the Supreme Court, the dicta in Yoder, 
and made it a key element in its test of religiosity.89 The court ultimately 
found this test dispositive, and held that the plaintiffs concerns were “more 
akin to Thoreau’s rejection of ‘the contemporary secular values accepted by 
the majority’ than to the ‘deep religious convictions’ of the Amish.”90 The 
plaintiff, Frank Africa, a prisoner in Pennsylvania state prison, was a 
“Naturalist Minister” for the MOVE organization, a self-professed religion 
and “revolutionary organization” that sought a “‘natural,’ ‘moving,’ 
‘active,’ and ‘generating’ way of life” as opposed to the “artificial” and 
“systematic.”91 For the purposes of the suit, this “way of life” boiled down 
to a belief that one should only eat raw food, a belief with which Africa’s 
previous prison was willing to comply, but to which his current one 
objected.92  
In deciding that MOVE was not a religion,93 and thus denying the claim, 
the court relied on a three-factor test originally used in Judge Adams’s 
concurring opinion in Malnak v. Yogi.94 The first factor is the “nature of the 
ideas in question,” which must be related to one’s “ultimate concern.”95 This 
is the element that Africa, building on Malnak, reduced to a determination 
whether the belief was more similar to that of the Amish or Thoreau.96 The 
second factor is comprehensiveness; in Malnak, Judge Adams argued that a 
 
 
 86. See Usman, supra note 5, at 173 (finding Yoder in 1972 to be “the last significant 
pronouncement[] from the Supreme Court on what constitutes a religion”). 
 87. Id. at 173–76 (surveying the various circuit courts’ definitions). I focus on the Third and Tenth 
Circuit definitions because they most effectively indicate the problem that the equal protection method 
solves: the fundamental disconnect between finding that a party is religious and finding that a party 
should be accommodated. For an excellent, recent discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s approach, see 
Courtney Miller, Note, “Spiritual But Not Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition of Religion, 102 
VA. L. REV. 833 (2016). 
 88. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d. Cir. 1981). 
 89. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 1533 (distilling Africa to a requirement that “a belief system . . . 
have more in common with the belief system of the Amish than with that of Thoreau”). 
 90. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035. 
 91. Id. at 1025−26. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1031−32 (“Few tasks that confront a court require more circumspection than that of 
determining whether a particular set of ideas constitutes a religion within the meaning of the first 
amendment.”). 
 94. 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d. Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).  
 95. Id. at 208 (quoting PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1–2 (1958)). These ultimate concerns 
are worth protecting because they are “the most ‘intensely personal’ and important to the believer.” Id. 
 96. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035. 
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religion is “not generally confined to one question or one moral teaching,” 
but rather has “a broader scope”97 as a “ruling science” that purports to 
answer all questions.98 In contrast, Africa’s all-encompassing focus on 
“rawness”99 was only a “single-faceted” secular belief, and such beliefs 
must be distinguishable from religions.100 The court completely rejected the 
possibility that the “added meaning and importance” of the belief to Africa 
could cause such a belief to be “declared religious” and be “accorded first 
amendment protection.”101  
The final element is the “formal, external, or surface signs” of a 
religion.102 The Tenth Circuit, citing heavily to Africa in deciding a similar 
issue in United States v. Meyers, referred to these as “accoutrements of 
religion.”103 The court provided eleven example features: the existence of a 
founder or prophet, important writings, gathering places, keepers of 
knowledge (i.e., clergy), ceremonies and rituals, structure or organization, 
holidays, a practice of diet or fasting, guidance as to appearance and 
clothing, and propagation.104 The Africa court found these structural 
characteristics lacking.105 MOVE was a non-hierarchical “revolutionary 
organization;”106 despite Africa’s title as “Naturalist Minister;” it had no 
services, no holidays, and no literature.107 Though the court’s holding was 
neither “wholly free from doubt”108 nor “unassailable,”109 it found that 
MOVE was too dissimilar from a religion to warrant the protections of the 
First Amendment.110 
 
 
 97. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209.  
 98. Id. (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Prologue to Commentary of IV Books of Sentences, 
reprinted in AN AQUINAS READER 411 (M. Clark. ed. 1972)). 
 99. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1027 (“Our [MOVE’s] religion is raw, our belief is pure as original, reliable 
as chemical free water.”). 
 100. Id. at 1035 (“[W]ere we to conclude that Africa's views, taken as a whole, satisfied the 
comprehensiveness criterion, it would be difficult to explain why other single-faceted ideologies—such 
as economic determinism, Social Darwinism, or even vegetarianism—would not qualify as religions 
under the first amendment.”) 
 101. Id. 
 102. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209. Examples include “formal services, ceremonial functions, the 
existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other 
similar manifestations.” Id. 
 103. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d. 1475, 1483 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 104. Id. at 1483–84 (1996). The court was careful to note that the “threshold for establishing the 
religious nature of [the] beliefs . . . is low” and that no one factor was dispositive. Id. at 1482−83. 
 105. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1036 (“MOVE is not structurally analogous to those ‘traditional’ 
organizations that have been recognized as religions under the first amendment.”). 
 106. Id. at 1034.  
 107. Id. at 1036. 
 108. Id. at 1033. 
 109. Id. at 1035. 
 110. Id. at 1036 (“[T]he Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not required under the first amendment 
to supply Frank Africa with a special raw-food diet.”). The court further narrowed its decision by noting 
that the holding was only binding with regard to Frank Africa himself and not as to other MOVE 
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C. Unique or Special 
The analysis that began in Yoder and extended to Africa and Meyers 
amounts to an external analogy test111: comparing the objective qualities of 
the claimant’s beliefs with those of core or “paradigmatic” religions.112 The 
fundamental problem with this test is that it never justifies the results that 
come from the definition.113 Definitions might help a judge identify what a 
religion is, and whether a given belief is religious,114 but never answers the 
more important question of whether the belief should be accommodated.115 
It explains only what is unique about religion, in a descriptive sense, but not 
what is special about it in a normative one; treating religion as a 
“talisman”116 that by itself results in accommodation.117 What would 
meaningfully have changed had Africa and his organization fulfilled the 
structural and comprehensiveness requirements that the court laid out?118 
First, it should be noted that many of the features used to dismiss 
Africa’s claim are shared with other groups that are undoubtedly religious. 
 
 
members, id. at 1036 n.22, and that there was still room for an Eighth Amendment claim, id. at 1036 
n.23. 
 111. See id. at 1032 (referring to the test as “the ‘definition by analogy’ approach”). Cf. Kent 
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 753 (1984) (“[C]ourts 
should decide whether something is religious by comparison with the indisputably religious, in light of 
the particular legal problem involved.”). 
 112. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 1553 (identifying eight features proposed for a “paradigm of a 
religious belief system” based on “the features common to most traditional Eastern and Western 
religions”). 
 113. See Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1115 (2011) (“[W]hen courts ask 
whether something counts as religion in a particular doctrinal and factual context they are really asking 
whether it should be protected, which is a substantive matter.”). 
 114. See Africa, 662 F.2d at 1036 (“We do not conclude that Africa’s sincerely-held beliefs are 
false, misguided, or unacceptable, but only that those beliefs, as described in the record before us, are 
not ‘religious’ as the law has defined the term.”). 
 115. See Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1115 (criticizing definitional approaches as “shortcuts past 
meticulous doctrinal analysis”). 
 116. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-
5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). 
 117. Cf. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) (“The Constitution . . . . does 
not blindly afford the same absolute protection to acts done in the name of or under the impetus of 
religion.”). Kuch rejected the claims for exemption from controlled substances laws of the Neo-
American Church that was clear satire of Abrahamic religion’s accoutrements, including its use of a 
book known as the “Boo Hoo Bible” for its catechism.  
 118. See Greenawalt, supra note 111, at 776 n.97 (“Africa represented himself at the crucial hearing 
about his beliefs, and one has the sense that these beliefs might have looked different if formulated with 
professional help.”). Counsel for the appeal unsuccessfully argued that Africa was pantheistic; the court 
simply noted that Africa had not framed his belief as such. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033. Similarly, Africa 
explicitly contrasted MOVE’s tenets with religion in a misguided attempt to argue that they were even 
more important. See id. at 1027 (“Africa contends that ‘while religion is seen as a way of life, our religion 
is simply the way of life, as our religion in fact is life.’”). Perhaps recognizing these rather 
unsophisticated mistakes, the court qualified its decision when it held that “MOVE, at least as described 
by Africa, is not a religion,” id. at 1036 (emphasis added).  
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The court, at one point, even explicitly compared MOVE’s views with a 
passage from First Corinthians.119 Nevertheless, it found features lacking.120 
The lack of holidays was considered indicative, though Africa himself 
argued that it was because “every day of the year is equally important.”121 
This lack of holidays is shared with Jehovah’s Witnesses, who reject 
celebrations for a somewhat similar reason.122 The lack of hierarchy was 
also deemed indicative of the non-religious nature of MOVE, though that 
feature is shared with, among many others, the Quakers.123 Similar 
distinctions based on the existence of hierarchical clergy were central to the 
finding of irrationality in Center for Inquiry.124 
What MOVE lacked primarily was a comprehensive system, services, 
and a scripture.125 While all of these things might indicate sincerity,126 they 
do not answer the important question and explain why the underlying 
request for a raw food diet would be more worthy of respect by the state of 
Pennsylvania.127 Were Africa to have a scripture, or rather had he produced 
it to the court,128 what would change? Legally speaking, could anything 
change?129 If the scripture supports his diet, then all it adds is some level of 
sincerity; if the scripture does not necessarily support his diet, then the 
Supreme Court has plainly rejected ruling against the claimant for such a 
 
 
 119. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035 n.20 (quoting 1 Corinthians 10:31 (“Whether therefore ye eat, or 
drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.”)). 
 120. Id. at 1036 (“MOVE lacks almost all of the formal identifying characteristics common to most 
recognized religions.”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Holidays, THEJEHOVAHSWITNESSES.ORG, http://thejehovahswitnesses.org/holidays.php 
[https://perma.cc/GM6T-QMXB] (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (rejecting holidays because “God should 
get all the honor and glory” and recognizing that “the Watchtower organization is honored to excess 365 
days per year as God’s channel of communication to the world”). 
 123. See FAQs about Quakers, FRIENDS GENERAL CONFERENCE, http://www.fgcquaker.org/ 
explore/faqs-about-quakers [https://perma.cc/H2N7-PAHP] (last visited Oct. 10, 2016) (“Quakers 
believe that we are all ministers . . . .”). This is presumably why the Quakers’ Society of Friends received 
a specific exemption in the Indiana statute at issue in Center for Inquiry. IND. CODE § 31-11-6-1(6) 
(2015). 
 124. See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the inconsistent treatment of various non-clergied religions including Buddhists, 
Rastafarians, Jainists, Baha’is, German Baptists, and Quakers). 
 125. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1036 (“MOVE cannot lay claim to be a comprehensive, multi-faceted 
theology . . . MOVE lacks the defining structural characteristics of a traditional religion.”). 
 126. The Africa court, like many courts, identified this issue as withdrawn. See Africa, 662 F.2d at 
1030 (“The requirement of sincerity poses no obstacle to Africa in this case.”). 
 127. See Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1140 (“[T]here is little to be gained by asking whether nonbelief 
‘is’ religion in a given legal setting, as opposed to asking whether it should be protected there.”). 
 128. Frank Africa argued that another man, John Africa, had written the general tenets of MOVE as 
a sort of catechism, but they were not made available to the district court. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1036. 
 129. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Men may believe what they cannot 
prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.”). 
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reason in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment.130 Equally puzzling, 
if MOVE had conducted weekly services with multiple members and a text, 
but only Africa believed the text required him to eat raw foods, it could not 
hurt his claim: the Court likewise rejected such reasoning in Thomas v. 
Review Board of Indiana.131 To reject MOVE as a religion, while granting 
Frazee and Thomas’s beliefs the label, is to require merely that one have 
these accoutrements indicative of a paradigmatic religion, but leave their 
contents irrelevant.132 
The same problem applies to the “comprehensiveness” and “ultimate 
concerns” tests as applied in Africa—to require them is to allow the mere 
existence of these other beliefs to somehow give his dietary claim value that 
it would not have in their absence.133 The court cannot question if a 
claimant’s beliefs, whether dietary or moral or theological, are central,134 
true,135 or even reasonable;136 thus we are left with existence as the only 
relevant remaining factor. This is why the Center for Inquiry court was so 
careful to focus the question on whether claimants were “identical with 
respect to the attribute selected for that accommodation.”137 It might be true 
that single-facet ideologues “share only one, albeit vehemently held, 
 
 
 130. 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Frazee involved a non-denominational Christian who refused to work on 
Sundays. Illinois denied his claim because it was not based on “tenets or dogma” of a recognized 
“church, sect, or denomination.” Id. at 830. The Court reversed, rejecting the idea that “one must be 
responding to the commands of a particular religious organization” to receive First Amendment 
protection. Id. at 834. 
 131. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Thomas involved a Jehovah’s Witness who worked at a steel mill that 
began directly machining parts for tanks rather than just producing the raw materials. Id. at 709−10. 
Although his fellow Witnesses found this consistent with their faith, he considered working there 
“unscriptual” and quit. Id. at 711. Based on this divide, the lower court found that quitting was a 
“personal philosophical choice” rather than religious. Id. at 713. The Court reversed, noting that “the 
judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve [intrafaith differences].” Id. at 715.  
 132. See Miller, supra note 87, at 836 (“Beyond [the] core category of believers, modern doctrine 
also protects idiosyncratic versions of traditional religions . . . . In other words, members of recognized 
religions do not have to subscribe to shared beliefs in order to receive legal protection.”). But see United 
States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) (investigating the Neo-American Church and 
finding “a conscious effort to assert in passing the attributes of religion but obviously only for tactical 
purposes,” thus leading to no accommodation). 
 133. They function as a mere “statutory hoop,” Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 
758 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2014), that a party must jump through before getting to the real question: 
whether the claim at issue should be accommodated. 
 134. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“What principle of law or logic can be brought 
to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?”). 
 135. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (finding unconstitutional the possibility that 
religious individuals “could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those 
teachings [of the gospel] contained false representations”). 
 136. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (“[T]he federal courts have 
no business addressing whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable.”) (parentheses 
omitted). 
 137. Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872 (emphasis added). 
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opinion” with religious persons that are provided an accommodation.138 But, 
without a somehow narrowed definition of religion,139 that one opinion is 
the only relevant factor shared among all parties with similar claims.140 A 
system that requires these irrelevant doctrines treats religion as nothing 
more than a talisman, a ticket to accommodation, a “shortcut,”141 and not as 
justification for the accommodation itself.142 Even worse, it results in 
exactly what the Third Circuit desired to avoid: it shows an unjustified 
“predisposition toward conventional religions,” i.e., those that have these 
accoutrements, and leaves others “branded mere secular beliefs.”143 This 
significant danger in dismissing certain beliefs as non-religious does not 
affect only idiosyncratic believers like Africa, but is at risk of reaching even 
obviously core religions under the right (or wrong) circumstances.144 
It should be noted that the inherent weakness of the factors identified by 
the court does not necessarily mean it made the wrong decision as to 
whether MOVE was a religion.145 As the court repeatedly noted, it was a 
 
 
 138. Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 441 (M.D. Penn. 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-
01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 139. A possibility that is normatively undesirable, see supra note 73, and almost certainly 
unconstitutional, see infra note 237. 
 140. To return to the example of the contraceptive mandate, just in the two primary cases that were 
granted certiorari, we see Catholics—Geneva College v. Sec’y United States HHS, 778 F.3d 422, 427 
(3d. Cir. 2015), remanded, sub nom., Zubik v. Burwell , Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-
105, 15-119, 15-191, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (May 16, 2016) (per curiam); Mennonites—Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014); and Evangelical Christians—id. at 2765. Though 
these are all Christian denominations, legally speaking we must treat that as a coincidence or else be at 
serious risk of violating the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christianity. Cf., e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706 (1994) (invalidating Hasidic school district because it “singles out a 
particular religious sect for special treatment”). To the extent the Christian claimants are similar to each 
other and to a hypothetical Buddhist or Hindu who seeks exemption from the mandate, the distinction 
against March for Life is arbitrary because there is no discernible common factor among the claimants 
missing from March for Life. 
 141. Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1115. 
 142. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 
1510–13 (1999) (critiquing views of free exercise that provide a “broad right to do whatever your 
religion motivates . . . simply because of your religious motivation”). But see Real Alts., 150 F. Supp. 
3d at 438 (“[I]t is not by their beliefs that the Departments have elected to differentiate the two. Rather, 
it is by the foundations for those beliefs.”). 
 143. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1031; cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 55 (“The antithesis of 
religious liberty is religious persecution; and the essence of religious persecution is the systematic 
disadvantaging of persons because they are not loyal to the ‘right’ religious beliefs.”). 
 144. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1890) (“To call [Mormonism’s polygamy] a tenet 
of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.”); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 731 
F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013) (questioning whether the wearing of a hijab is a religious or “purely 
personal” belief because it does not relate to “ultimate ideas”), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2028 
(2015). 
 145. The “leading substantive definition” of religion is “a system of communal beliefs and practices 
relative to superhuman beings.” Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1134 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD RELIGIONS 915 (Wendy Doniger ed., 1999), among others). It seems by such 
a definition MOVE should not qualify: the raw and artificial does not implicate anything explicitly 
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close call on a difficult question.146 What these problems really indicate is 
that the question itself is useless: the unique features of religion do 
nothing—can do nothing—to support its special status generally.147 The 
characteristic that warrants protection is not only “altogether separate from 
theism,”148 it is separate even from a broader concept of religiosity. The 
court feared that recognizing MOVE as a religion would begin the slippery 
slope to vegetarianism being considered a religion.149 It is good to be 
cautious on that point: as much as the courts do not want such an expansive 
definition that saps “religion” of all meaning, vegetarians too reject the 
label. Despite this rejection, at least some vegetarians will have a belief 
equally as sincere as some150 religious adherents and desire 
accommodation.151 Why then should we privilege only religion and not treat 
 
 
supernatural, and it is at least a partially open question as to how “communal” MOVE actually was. 
 146. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1034−36.  
 147. Cf. Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1140 (arguing that definitional approaches have “a potential cost, 
namely distraction from the substantive matters that should be (and perhaps in fact are) driving the 
analysis”). 
 148. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-
5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). 
 149. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035. The court’s parallel fears regarding economic determinism and Social 
Darwinism were probably the more worrying, however. Id.; accord Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. 
Supp. 3d 419, 441 (M.D. Penn. 2015) (“Allowing adherence to a single moral belief, even one with 
philosophical underpinnings, to be indistinguishable from religion or an entire moral creed such as 
Atheism or Buddhism leads us down a slippery slope.”), appeal filed, No. 16-01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 
2016); see also Miller, supra note 87, at 880 (rejecting veganism as a religion through application of the 
“‘metaphysical belief’ factor” from Meyers). Miller notes that this factor “highlights the importance of 
beliefs that are not rationally derived, and thus readily distinguishes deeply held secular beliefs [from 
religions].” Id. In addition to the fact that earlier on the same page she recognizes the functionally 
equivalent demands of “[b]ona fide religions [that] might require vegan diets,” id., this position also fails 
to recognize that not all vegans arrived at their position through a rational process, just as not all religious 
believers avoid rationality in considering their own beliefs. See generally, e.g., RENÉ DESCARTES, 
MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Jonathan Bennett, tr. 2007), 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/descartes1641.pdf.  
 150. We need not find that all non-religious claimants are as devout as all religious individuals to 
find the special status lacking. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 101 (noting that comparison 
between secular and religious values “does not depend on the idea, which is manifestly false, that 
religious convictions are comparable to any secular conviction or impulse, however frivolous”). The 
centrality of a belief has been identified as an imponderable and untouchable question for the courts. See 
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990). Because of this, in theory at least, an inconsistent or 
apathetic vegetarian who sincerely bases his practice on a religion not known for vegetarianism (e.g. 
Judaism) would nevertheless have an equivalent claim to a faithful Hindu vegetarian, and a stronger 
claim than even a particularly ardent non-religious vegan. Cf. Miller, supra note 87, at 891 (“If she had 
stated that she was a Christian and also drew inspiration from astrology, Tarot, and dancing, the hands-
off doctrine would essentially require that her beliefs be designated as religious.”). But see Hall v. 
Martin, No. 1:10-cv-1221-PLM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30572, at *12–14 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2015) 
(denying summary judgment for a Messianic Jew who demanded a kosher vegan diet on religious 
grounds). 
 151. See, e.g., Maulding v. Peters, No. 92 C 2518, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11001, at *15 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 2, 1995) (denying vegetarian prisoner accommodation “absent religious or medical peculiar 
circumstances”). 
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non-religious moral beliefs or claims of conscience as equally deserving of 
the special status?152 
III. WHY PROTECT RELIGION? 
The first response, and the one relied on by the courts in Yoder and Africa 
is simple textualism: the Constitution only protects religion.153 In the 
framework at play in those cases, in which the Free Exercise Clause was the 
pertinent law, pure textualism is a reasonable answer on a legal level, even 
if it may be unsatisfying on a normative one.154 The Constitution need not 
justify itself. However, since the time of those cases the power of the Free 
Exercise Clause has dwindled.155 Meyers, for instance, was decided instead 
under the statutory Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) which 
does require justification.156 Similarly, the regulatory and statutory 
exemptions in March for Life and Center for Inquiry required rational 
justification for distinguishing between the targets of the exemption and the 
plaintiffs;157 a justification that those courts could not find.158 
 
 
 152. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 1522 (discussing early drafts of the First Amendment that 
included freedom of conscience); Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1405 (“For reasons unknown, the 
Framers of the First Amendment rejected language that referred to the ‘rights of conscience’ . . . 
preferring a narrower formulation in terms of the ‘free exercise’ of religion.”); McConnell, supra note 
14, at 12 (“The Framers of the First Amendment seriously considered enacting constitutional protection 
for ‘conscience,’ presumably a broader term, and deliberately adopted the term ‘religion’ instead.”). 
 153. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1034–35 (discussing Yoder). See also supra notes 1, 3–4 and accompanying 
text.  
 154. See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1426−27 (rejecting the Constitution’s special treatment of 
religion as morally lacking); SMITH, supra note 15, at 146 (finding the Constitution’s guarantee of 
religious freedom insufficiently protected by textualism). 
 155. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting the use of the Yoder compelling interest 
test to invalidate “generally applicable” laws). 
 156. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996). See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997) (invalidating RFRA as applied to the states for exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers); 
see also RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2012) (invoking Congress’s spending and interstate 
commerce powers to statutorily invalidate portions of Boerne). While there is no explicit finding of 
which power justifies RFRA, it is probably best understood as relying on the powers underlying the 
particular law from which the claimant seeks accommodation—or rather the absence of power because 
of the absence of enforcement of that underlying law. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1903, 1925–28 (2001) (comparing these possibilities and defending the “no power” explanation as 
rhetorically superior). 
 157. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (requiring a legislative classification that 
“neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class” to “bear[] a rational relation to some 
legitimate end”). 
 158. But see Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 438 (M.D. Penn. 2015) (finding “a 
legitimate interest in protecting religious freedom,” allowing the exemption to “survive rational basis 
review”), appeal filed, No. 16-01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
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A. Religion as a Proxy 
Just because religion is not special does not mean it is not a useful 
concept on which to “moor” an accommodation.159 Nor does it mean that 
the hundreds of statutes that protect religious interests are inherently invalid 
or even particularly questionable.160 Professor Andrew Koppelman has 
proposed that the freedom of religion is not a protection of any particular 
right, but instead is best understood as a proxy protection for many 
interests.161 In so doing, he concedes the point that there is nothing that 
makes religion particularly special or definable,162 yet defends the status quo 
regardless.163 He compares the approach to a driver’s license: “[I]f ‘people 
who have passed driving exams’ are not ontologically distinct from those 
who have not, then there can be no justification for giving ‘people who have 
passed driving exams’ special treatment . . . . What we should be doing is 
privileging ‘people who are good drivers.’”164 That, of course, is impossible; 
instead, we as a society have decided to use a proxy: the driver’s license. 
This license is over- and underinclusive—some people could pass the test 
 
 
 159. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 126 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[HHS] has consequently 
moored this accommodation . . . in the vernacular of religious protection.”), appeal docketed, No. 15-
5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). The March for Life court found this choice “puzzling.” Id. The Real 
Alternatives court, in contrast, held that “the Departments . . . had no reason to treat groups that espouse 
these views as equivalents to religion.” Real Alts., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 442. This Part seeks to explain 
why this choice was not puzzling, and why the equal protection method does not impute any specific ill 
will, or even apathy, towards policymakers who choose to protect religion. 
 160. Cf. Real Alts., 150 F. Supp. 3d at 439 (arguing that Real Alternatives’s equal protection claim 
is functionally identical to “negating” the regulatory exemption from the Contraceptive Mandate). 
Though I question, as a factual matter, the claim that a narrowly tailored injunction could actually negate 
the exemption as a whole, this argument insufficiently recognizes the equal protection claim’s reliance 
on the exemption’s existence in order for it to be extended (by injunction or otherwise) because there is 
no discernible ground for the non-religious parties to create the accommodation from whole cloth. See 
infra Part IV.B for further analysis of this point. 
 161. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 75 (“Religion is not a proxy for any other single value . . . . There 
are many candidates for the replacement position . . . .”). In his book, Koppelman lists some of these 
interests: 
“Religion,” then, denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation (if you think you need to be 
saved), harmony with the transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists), responding to the 
fundamentally imperfect character of human life (if it is imperfect), courage in the face of the 
heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind of encouragement helps), a transcendent 
underpinning for the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning helps), contact with 
that which is awesome and indescribable (if awe is something you feel), and many others. 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 23, at 124. 
 162. See Andrew Koppelman, “Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah 
Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1079, 1079 (2014) (“Since there is no such thing as religion, if 
such accommodations are justified, the justification must ultimately depend on some desideratum other 
than religion. Religion can only be a proxy.”). 
 163. See Koppelman, supra note 10, at 72 (“There is, of course, nothing necessarily privileged about 
the status quo, but . . . . [The United States] has done a fine job of handling [religious] diversity . . . .”). 
 164. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 74. 
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despite being terrible drivers, while others could fail the test yet be 
wonderful drivers.165 
Similarly, religion is over- and underinclusive: those interests that it 
protects are only “more likely to be salient in religious than in nonreligious 
contexts”—they are not exclusive to religion.166 For Koppelman, the 
overinclusiveness is precisely the advantage of the proxy: because there is 
no true definition of religion, the word covers what we intuitively 
understand to be religious regardless of the form of the belief.167 He rejects 
that there are significant problems of unfairness due to underinclusiveness, 
except at theoretical peripheries.168 The non-religious simply do not have an 
analogous need for the proxy; they rely directly on interests such as 
conscience or moral conviction.169 To the extent that these are relevant on 
the margins, they are often already accommodated within religious 
accommodations by broader “conscience clauses.”170 
B. Supplemental Proxies 
One of the problems with the proxy as an ultimate justification for 
religious accommodation is precisely the fact that it does not rely on any 
special ontological significance in religion, so there is no particular reason 
 
 
 165. For example, someone who is an excellent driver but has social anxiety might perform poorly 
with a stranger in the passenger seat carrying a clipboard. Otherwise, a person who is normally an 
inattentive driver might focus intently for the twenty minutes of the exam and pass despite the danger 
they pose on the road when unsupervised. 
 166. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 78. 
 167. See id. at 77 (recognizing the religious claims in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 
[expansion of a church] and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), 
[protection of a sacred forest] as being religious in a sense broader than freedom of conscience); accord 
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 5, at 809 (“Insofar as definitions of religion are needed at all, 
conventional, common sense definitions will suffice.”). 
 168. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 79; accord Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1409 (“[O]utside of 
specific high-stakes contexts, there might be relatively few instances in which nonbelievers seek 
constitutional exemptions for conflicts with their moral beliefs.”). Schwartzman, however, believes that 
healthcare law, such as in March for Life, is one of these high-stakes contexts. See Schwartzman, supra 
note 4, at 1408−09. 
 169. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 79 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1, 10–11 (“[U]nbelief entails no obligations and no observances. Unbelief 
may be coupled with various sorts of moral conviction . . . But these convictions must necessarily be 
derived from some source other than unbelief itself.”)). But see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and 
the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 976 (2004) (arguing that conscientious objection follows 
from non-belief in God because “[a]theists or agnostic draft objectors can plausibly assert that the 
nonexistence of a theistic god or an afterlife means that this life is of utmost importance, and therefore 
that the worst thing a person can do is end another’s life”). 
 170. See Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1408−09 (discussing many existing accommodations that 
cover both religious and secular claims of conscience), see also, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2015) 
(including “moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the 
strength of traditional religious views” in the EEOC’s definition of “religious”). 
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to stop at religion.171 Professor Schwartzman framed this objection as 
opening up the possibility of “supplemental proxies.”172 Using the driver’s 
license analogy again, Schwartzman imagines there was a particular subset 
of safe drivers who failed the test “in a specific and predictable way.”173 
Ideally, a better test might capture this subset, but that new test might be 
difficult to create or become unintentionally and dangerously 
overinclusive.174 The next best solution would be a second proxy designed 
to capture specifically those who fell through the cracks of the first proxy.175 
Koppelman likens this possibility to habeas review in the criminal context: 
a later-applied test that will “rescue” some of those who were wrongly 
identified by the original proxy.176 
This is precisely what the equal protection method in March for Life and 
Center for Inquiry attempts to be: the secondary proxy to religion.177 To the 
extent the legislature has identified room for an accommodation from an 
existing law, whether it be the contraceptive mandate or the requirement 
that a marriage be solemnized by an officer of the state, it is using religion 
as a proxy for some other interest.178 It frames the accommodation in the 
form of an exemption for religious believers, even though the interest the 
legislature is trying to protect is not necessarily unique to the religious.179 
 
 
 171. Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2014) 
(“[E]ven if religion is a reasonably good proxy for protecting a diversity of goods, it is not sufficient to 
establish that no other proxy can serve as a global substitute.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. An example would be the socially anxious drivers discussed in note 165, supra. 
 174. Continuing the example, tests without an examiner in the passenger seat might help those with 
social anxiety, but also lead to more bad drivers passing due to the reduction in supervision. Given the 
relative population of these two kinds of people, having the examiner in the passenger seat is better 
overall—even if not ideal—because it passes more good drivers and fewer bad drivers than the 
alternative. Similarly, Koppelman believes that religion is an “adequate” proxy for which substitutions 
would be underinclusive, but denies that it is perfect. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 78.  
 175. Schwartzman, supra note 171, at 1099, goes further, arguing that it is “necessary to show that 
there are no feasible supplemental proxies” in order “[t]o rebut the charge of unfairness” (emphasis 
added). 
 176. Koppelman, supra note 162, at 1083. 
 177. Despite the precise focus on the interest being accommodated, it is still only a secondary proxy 
and neither a direct proxy nor a direct accommodation of the underlying interest. This is true because 
the rational basis standard of the equal protection method, requiring that the parties be identically 
situated, is necessarily an underinclusive subset of a group seeking accommodation. In addition, the 
analysis relies on existing exemptions and provides no means to create its own accommodation from the 
application of a particular law, see infra Part IV.B. Thus, even if the equal protection method were 
adopted by the Supreme Court, it would not defeat the value or even the necessity of providing 
conscience clauses that, by their express terms, extend accommodations beyond religion. 
 178. Whether that interest be “an employment relationship based in part on a shared objection to 
abortifacients,” March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d. 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, 
No. 15-5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015), or something less tangible such as “celebrat[ing] their values,” 
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 179. See March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 127 (“[W]hat HHS claims to be protecting is religious 
beliefs, when it actually is protecting a moral philosophy about the sanctity of human life . . . Where 
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Recognizing this underlying interest, courts may expand the exemption to 
the non-religious who are similarly situated in the relevant aspect for which 
the religious accommodation is a proxy.180 Because this method does not 
ever question the basic legitimacy of broad, legislative religious 
exemptions, but only the irrationality of a specific line drawn, it acts as the 
exact opposite of the destructive argument that seeks to replace religious 
freedom with some form of generalized freedom.181  
The primary advantage of the equal protection method is that it allows 
courts to accommodate religious and non-religious beliefs that are 
substantially similar without granting these non-religions the title of 
“religion” in violation of both the text of the Constitution and common-
sense.182 The framework also removes much of the incentive for non-
religious believers to fraudulently or hypocritically reframe their claims as 
religious.183 Furthermore, it works to cement the validity of religious 
exemptions;184 so long as a religious belief is not being privileged over a 
similar secular belief, there is no reason to complain of the 
accommodation.185 None of these advantages mean anything, however, if 
this framework is inconsistent with the law. Thus, in the next Part, I will 
 
 
HHS has erred, however, is in assuming that this trait is unique to [religious] organizations. It is not.”). 
 180. Cf. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 5, at 830 (arguing that “the Religion Clauses prevent the 
forms of mistreatment historically associated with religious conflict . . . [including] injuries inflicted on 
the ground that the targeted activity is viewed as not religious” and thus, “we do not have to decide 
whether [claimants’] reasons for action are religious in character”). 
 181. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 95 (“The basic idea [of Equal Liberty] is this: if 
American law in general respects liberty and accommodates individual needs, then a sufficiently 
powerful equality principle will ensure that it also respects religious needs in particular.”); id. at 96–97 
(using “[h]ealth-exemption analogies” as secular accommodations against which religious 
accommodation requests are compared). The equal protection method, in contrast, finds situations in 
which religious needs are accommodated, as they often (though not always) are, and expands the 
accommodation to similar non-religious claims. A sufficiently libertarian individual might even prefer 
both methods working in parallel to maximize individual freedom. 
 182. Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1136 (noting that “commonsensical understandings of religion” 
provide a limit to a court’s ability to interpret the term religion); Schwartzman, supra note 171, at 1101–
02 (finding appealing “[t]he strategy of expanding the definition of religion,” but noting the “significant 
practical difficulties” in expanding beyond conventional meanings). 
 183. See Marshall, supra note 68, at 326 (“[T]he integrity of religion does not benefit from a system 
that encourages individuals to characterize their beliefs in religious terms . . . . Religion is not served 
when it becomes the tool for fraudulent or specious claims.”). 
 184. Cf. id. at 310 (arguing that making religious exemption dependent on the religious nature of 
the claimant “undermines the constitutional values it purports to protect”); EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra 
note 13, at 55 (tracing the “unfortunate circle” traveled by requiring that a claimant be “‘religious’ in the 
right way” when one of the primary reasons for religious exemption is that “religious belief is no 
business of the state”). 
 185. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding 
a violation of the Establishment Clause when RFRA “provided the Church with a legal weapon that no 
atheist or agnostic can obtain”). While certainly more religious than non-religious people would profit 
even under this framework, so long as it does not lead to “no atheist or agnostic” benefiting, Justice 
Stevens’ argument should wither, if not perish.  
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show how this method may actually follow from “[t]he long history of 
precedent” that appears to reject it.186 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND RELIGIOUS-SECULAR EQUIVALENCE 
The result of finding that religion is not special, but only a proxy, is that 
religious and non-religious beliefs, similarly situated with regard to an 
underlying interest, should be treated equally by the law. But that, by itself, 
does not lead to any particular result.187 “As a general matter, the state can 
treat religious and secular doctrines equally either by granting or by denying 
exemptions for both.”188 Since 1990, outside of specific contexts, the latter, 
low protection approach has applied as a matter of constitutional law.189 On 
the statutory level, however, the accommodation for religion has never been 
higher, most notably through RFRA190 and RLUIPA,191 but also through 
individual statutory exemptions, such as the exemption of religious 
organizations from most taxes,192 the right to object to performance of 
sterilization or abortion,193 or the exemption of conscientious objectors from 
the draft.194  
It is in this statutory model of religious exemptions that non-religious 
beliefs best share in exemptions: the method does not rely on the text of the 
 
 
 186. Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 442 (M.D. Penn. 2015) (arguing that precedent 
supports religious freedom as a legitimate government interest per se), appeal filed, No. 16-01275 (3d 
Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 187. Cf. Iowa-Des Moines Nat’l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931) (“The right invoked is 
that to equal treatment; and such treatment will be attained if either their competitors' taxes are increased 
or their own reduced.”).  
 188. Schwartzman, supra note 4, at 1401; see also Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1140–41 (“[S]ome 
argu[e] that free exercise law should be leveled up to include [nonbelievers] and others say[] that the 
only workable solution is to level down, so that neither religious nor nonreligious people can claim 
exceptional protection in court.”). 
 189. These specific contexts include laws that amount to “religious gerrymander,” see, e.g., Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 
397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring)), or involve freedom of a church generally, rather than 
a specific accommodation, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012) (finding the First Amendment prevents courts from interfering with a church’s internal structure). 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
 192. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (granting tax exemptions to organizations “operated exclusively for 
religious . . . purposes”); I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2012) (exempting from filing “churches, their 
integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches” and “the exclusively religious 
activities of any religious order”). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2012) (prohibiting the “imposition of certain requirements contrary to 
religious beliefs or moral convictions,” such as courts or public authorities demanding performance of 
sterilization or abortion procedures in order to receive federal funds). 
 194. 50 U.S.C. App’x § 456(j) (2012) (granting conscientious objector status to one who “by reason 
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form”). 
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Constitution, which explicitly and unimpeachably singles out religion,195 
and it only covers those situations in which the legislature has already found 
room for accommodation from a regulatory scheme.196 There is no fear of 
anarchy resulting from individual non-religious demands of conscience that 
could expand beyond that of the religious persons already 
accommodated.197 Nor is there a slippery slope: the “similarly situated” 
standard expressly avoids modifying the exemption in any significant 
way.198 Even if we treat any change in the scope of the exemption as 
undesirable,199 the ball remains always in the legislature’s court to modify 
rights that have expanded too far or are simply flawed.200 
A. Constitutional Lows: Employment Division v. Smith 
When the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Employment 
 
 
 195. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1493 (noting that the “plausible” possibility that exemptions 
should be limited purely to the religious “doesn’t apply if one rejects the constitutional exemption 
model” in favor of a statutory model: “[o]ne would have to explain why, as a constitutional matter, such 
a preference for religion comports with the Establishment Clause, and why, as a policy matter, the 
preference is morally sound”). 
 196. Cf. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 433 (2006) 
(finding RFRA exemption for religious use of hoasca, a Schedule I hallucinogen, based on the already 
existing statutory exemption for peyote, another Schedule I hallucinogen); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (noting that “HHS has already devised and implemented a system 
that seeks to respect . . . religious liberty” and thus could easily extend it to new claimants). 
 197. See Schwartzman, supra note 171, at 1097 (“[T]he ‘welfare monster’ objection [to freedom of 
conscience] . . . applies with equal force to claims for religious accommodations.”). To the extent we 
fear allowing Africa to overburden the prison cafeteria, a religious exemption for Jewish, Muslim, or 
Hindu prisoners can do the same. If such a claim were too extreme, say, a religious requirement that one 
only eat caviar-encrusted filet mignon, it should be equally rejected whether it is Kuch, Africa, Yoder, 
or Pope Francis requesting the exemption under his respective religion. 
 198. Contra Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 441–42 (M.D. Penn. 2015) (discussing 
the “[d]eleterious effects” of the equal protection method, including the slippery slope that leads to 
finding “all such exemptions should fail”), appeal filed, No. 16-01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). If 
anything, the result would effectively be an elimination of the underlying law and not the exemption if 
it were to cover too many objecting parties. In the extreme, if an “actual” majority objected to a law, 
then perhaps that law should not exist. Cf. McConnell, supra note 78 at 1148 (“Who can doubt that there 
would be exceptions to social security (or, more likely, no social security at all) if mainstream Christians 
were forbidden by their religion to participate?”); Marshall, supra note 68, at 316 (“A society is never 
likely to find a strong regulatory interest in a measure that is hostile to the majoritarian tradition, and 
accordingly is unlikely to pass such a measure in the first place.”). 
 199. A position that has serious problems if we simply replace the non-religious claimant with an 
unknown or idiosyncratic religious claimant that was equally unanticipated by the legislature. In some 
cases this view avoids the exact advantage of using the broad concept of religion as the interest to be 
accommodated. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1477 (arguing that judicial determination of ambiguous 
statutory exemptions in general depends on, among other things, the legislature’s expectation “that it 
was unlikely to anticipate adequately” those situations in which the statute should not apply); supra Part 
III (arguing for the stronger claim that religion is an intentionally vague proxy for other interests). 
 200. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1474–75 (noting that the statutory exemption model, unlike the 
constitutional exemption model, “leave[s] the final decision to legislative discretion” rather than to the 
courts).  
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Division v. Smith,201 it came as a shock.202 The facts were quite simple and 
almost completely indistinguishable from a long line of cases that had been 
affirmed unanimously only one year prior.203 The two plaintiffs were 
members of the Native American Church who were fired from their jobs as 
drug counselors for their sacramental use of peyote,204 an illegal 
hallucinogen under Oregon law.205 All but ignoring precedent,206 and even 
potential issues of jurisdiction,207 the Court denied their First Amendment 
claim for unemployment compensation.208 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated plainly that the Court 
“ha[d] never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State 
is free to regulate.”209 Four Justices resoundingly rejected this descriptive 
statement,210 and scholars referred to the holding as a “revision” of free 
 
 
 201. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 202. See Ryan, supra note 18, at 1409–10 (surveying the “hostility generated by Smith” and noting 
that “[o]f the sixteen law review articles and notes written on the case, all but one [Marshall, supra note 
68] condemned the result”); RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2012) (finding that Smith “virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion”). 
 203. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause requires a 
compelling state interest for a state to deny unemployment benefits to an employee who quit their job 
for religious reasons); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (applying Sherbert to a claimant 
with religious beliefs idiosyncratic to his particular sect); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 
480 U.S. 136 (1987) (applying Sherbert to a claimant who converted to a religion incompatible with her 
pre-existing employment); Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (applying Sherbert to a 
claimant with religious beliefs unrelated to any particular sect).  
 204. Interestingly enough for this Note, though completely unexplored by the Court, there is a 
question as to whether the use of peyote was, strictly speaking, religious. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 
23, at 134 (“[N]either of the claimants in Smith was motivated to use peyote by religious conscience. Al 
Smith was motivated primarily by interest in exploring his Native American racial identity, and Galen 
Black was merely curious about the Church.”). 
 205. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 206. See McConnell, supra note 78, at 1122–24 (criticizing Smith for a lack of a “coherent 
distinction” from the unemployment cases). Notably, the Court completely failed to mention Frazee in 
its decision, instead stating that there were only three unemployment compensation cases. See Smith, 
494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie as the “three occasions” on which the Court has 
applied the Sherbert test); McConnell, supra note 78, at 1122 n.56 (offering “no explanation for this 
omission”). 
 207. The Court attempted to distinguish the Sherbert line of cases on the grounds that peyote was 
criminally prohibited. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. However, the Oregon Supreme Court had foreclosed that 
distinction as a matter of “Oregon’s unemployment compensation law,” (i.e., state law) finding the 
potential for criminal sanctions “immaterial.” Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 147 (Or. 1988) (per 
curiam). See also McConnell, supra note 78, at 1111–14 (detailing the myriad reasons why “Smith was 
an unlikely vehicle” for its result).  
 208. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (“Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny 
respondents unemployment compensation . . . .”). 
 209. Id. at 878–79. 
 210. Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s holding dramatically departs from well-
settled First Amendment jurisprudence . . . .”); Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Until today, I 
thought [the compelling interest test] was a settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First 
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exercise jurisprudence.211 In its holding, the Court had reverted back to an 
earlier, narrower reading of the religion clauses, made abundantly clear by 
the citations chosen in the opinion.212 Justice Scalia justified this shift by 
speaking in apocalyptic terms, claiming that broad religious exemptions 
were “courting anarchy.”213 Most tellingly was his reliance on the language 
of the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States214 that rejected any particular 
freedom to act religiously in favor of freedom of “mere religious belief.”215 
Religion had lost much of its special status as a result of the Smith ruling, 
dismissed haphazardly as a “constitutional anomaly”216 and a “luxury.”217 
While this was certainly a loss for religion, the holding in Smith could 
be read to bring about constitutional equivalence between religious and 
secular motivations through that loss.218 It does so by reducing the 
constitutionally mandated accommodation of religion to be equal to that of 
secular interests.219 In regards to both types of beliefs, the government must 
only meet the low bar of the rational relationship standard220 and the 
claimants, whether more like the Amish or more like Thoreau, are left at the 
mercy of the “political process.”221 The Court essentially decided that the 
complex constitutional tension of religion’s special status was best solved 
 
 
Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 211. McConnell, supra note 78; Marshall, supra note 68; accord Volokh, supra note 142 at 1473 
(“Smith largely overruled Sherbert and reinstituted the old statutory exemption model.”); Tebbe, supra 
note 113, at 1154 (calling Smith a “controversial turnabout”); sources supra note 202. 
 212. See McConnell, supra note 78, at 1124–27 (criticizing the Court’s choice of precedent, 
particularly its lengthy citations to Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)); Marshall, 
supra note 68, at 309 (conceding that the Smith opinion’s “use of precedent borders on fiction”). 
 213. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
 214. 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (claiming that the exemption of Mormons from laws against polygamy 
would “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself”); see Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 885, 890 
(repeating this language). 
 215. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
 216. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. 
 217. Id. at 888. 
 218. See id. at 878 (rejecting that “religious motivation . . . places [claimants] beyond the reach of 
a criminal law . . . that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who [act] for other reasons”). 
 219. See Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2063 (2011) 
(comparing the Equal Liberty theory of Eisgruber & Sager to “the Smith regime”). The basics of the 
Equal Liberty theory are discussed supra note 13. 
 220. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (comparing “[t]he government’s ability to enforce generally applicable 
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct” to “its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy”). The 
judicial review given to such policy preferences guarantees “only that the law shall not be unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object 
sought to be attained.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). See also John D. Inazu, The 
Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 819 (2014) (“[T]he Court [in 
Smith] concluded that neutral laws of general applicability need only pass rational basis scrutiny to 
survive constitutional challenge.”). 
 221. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
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by a “retreat from the effort to construe or enforce the clauses at all.”222  
  
 
 
 222. Smith, supra note 4, at 231. 
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B. Statutory Highs: RFRA and RLUIPA 
Despite all that can be said about Smith as a decision and its treatment of 
religious motivation, in practice, it “changed remarkably little.”223 As Judge 
Michael McConnell noted: “Even before Smith, legislative 
accommodations were far more important to the protection of religious 
exercise than the First Amendment. This fact is even more true today.”224 
Legislative accommodations are desirable not only because they, unlike the 
constitutional system pre-Smith, are controlled by policy-makers,225 but also 
because they tend to have “an identifiable burden . . . that can be said to be 
lifted.”226 Such a system easily avoids the anarchy warned about in Smith 
by not allowing a person to become a law unto himself—instead, the law 
merely exists as it is written.227  
This sort of statutory exemption model cleanly opens the way for the 
equal protection method of March for Life and Center for Inquiry in several 
ways. First, it identifies, either implicitly or explicitly, the interest for which 
religion is acting as a proxy.228 This functions as the interest against which 
the court can determine whether the claimant is similarly situated when 
extending the already-existing accommodation.229 This helps separate 
religiosity from the claimant’s worthiness of accommodation. Second, the 
fact that it is legislative rather than constitutional allows constitutional 
 
 
 223. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 257; accord Ryan, supra note 18, at 1412 (predicting 
that the impact of Smith “will likely be insignificant”); Tebbe, supra note 219, at 2056 (“[T]he 
controversy [of Smith] is actually more limited than many non-specialists recognize.”).  
 224. McConnell, supra note 14, at 5. 
 225. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (preferring to leave accommodation to the political process and 
democratic government rather than to a system in which judges weigh the social importance of laws); 
see Volokh, supra note 142, at 1522–24 (comparing constitutional religious exemption to substantive 
due process and arguing that the scope of rights and determination of harms must be left to the 
legislature). 
 226. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 227. See Magarian, supra note 156, at 1925 (comparing a situation where “Congress affirmatively 
states that [a] statute shall not apply” to a given group with a contrary situation in which a statute applies 
to a particular set of people that does not include that group). 
 228. In March for Life, the HHS did much of the work in identifying the interest as “an employment 
relationship based in part on a shared objection to abortifacients.” March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. 
Supp. 3d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). The Center 
for Inquiry court had to rely on the context of the underlying law and its relation to marriage to determine 
that the interest protected by allowing churches to solemnize marriage was the ability for individuals to 
“celebrate[] their values.” Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 875 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
 229. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 255–56 (arguing that “the Court can easily supply 
a remedy for [a group] by demanding that it have access to the system” already designed by the state 
when “institutional limits on the judiciary’s capacity to enforce” those rights would otherwise prevent 
such an action in the absence of that system). 
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avoidance230 to perform much of the work in broadly construing the statute 
to reach unforeseen claimants.231 Unlike a decision made purely by 
interpreting the Constitution, the legislature must comply with the 
Establishment Clause.232 Third, the scope of the right remains with the 
legislature even after judicial expansion. The equal protection method relies 
on the fact that the legislature was shortsighted in creating the exemption in 
the first place, thus the court performs the work of extending it to its proper 
scope.233 If the legislature did not understand its shortsightedness and at any 
point regrets the accommodation, it is free to remove it.234 This would return 
both religious and non-religious similarly situated parties to the status 
quo.235 If the legislature decries the slight expansion of the right,236 but 
 
 
 230. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 247–251 (2012). Scalia and Garner consider constitutional avoidance to consist of two 
rules. The “Constitutional-Doubt Canon” states that “[a] statute should be interpreted in a way that 
avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.” Id. at 247. The second rule requires that “if a case can be 
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of 
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.” Id. at 251 (quoting 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). This 
method applies whenever a possible construction would “raise serious questions of constitutionality,” 
id. at 248, and thus does not rely on a finding that a statute actually violates the Constitution.  
 231. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166, 176 (interpreting the term “religious beliefs” 
to include a claimant who follows the ethics of Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza in order to “avoid[] imputing 
to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs”). 
 232. By its explicit terms, the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Court nevertheless 
sought to make clear the ways in which its jurisprudence did not violate the Establishment Clause by 
essentially ordering another governmental entity to do so. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
409 (1963) (arguing that religious accommodation fulfills duties of neutrality and does not foster 
establishment); Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Does Not 
Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663, 665–66 (2001) (“[A]ccording to the 
authoritative case law . . . it is not just ‘Congress’ but all three branches of the national government that 
may not prohibit the free exercise of religion . . . .”). 
 233. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 192 (Douglas, J., concurring) (imputing “tolerance and sophistication 
to the Congress” in order to extend the law beyond its explicit terms). 
 234. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1476 (“When the legislature concludes that a court was too 
generous, it will specifically provide that the statute has no exemption.”); accord RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-3(b) (leaving the possibility that a law “explicitly excludes [application of RFRA] by reference 
to this chapter”). But see St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 644–45 
(7th Cir. 2007) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that legislative abrogation 
of RFRA protection is not neutral and generally applicable because only religious parties are originally 
provided such protections, and therefore abrogation violates the Free Exercise Clause). 
 235. Some have argued that this undesirable result should caution against broadening exemptions. 
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1493 (1990) (“[I]f the exercise of religion extends to ‘everything 
and anything,’ the interference with ordinary operations of government would be so extreme that the 
free exercise clause would fall of its own weight. To protect everything is to protect nothing.”). Where 
one lands on this issue likely depends on one’s relative weighting of equality and liberty, like so many 
issues of government. 
 236. This possibility, as a practical matter, is unlikely because extension generally does no harm to 
the original accommodation that the legislature sought. See Magarian, supra note 156, at 1983 (arguing 
that extension of RFRA to “nontheistic conscientious claims would be at worst irrelevant to the policy 
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wishes to keep it for the intended parties, then that can be circumstantial 
evidence that the law itself could have an invidious intent to promote 
specific religions in violation of the Establishment Clause.237 Simply 
because there is no rational reason for differently treating parties that are 
identically situated, the only possible motives for a legislature to 
affirmatively privilege religion in such a case must be “unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious.”238  
This system of precise statutory exemptions was likely the intended 
result of Smith.239 Congress, however, chose a different method and 
attempted to legislatively overrule the Court.240 In so doing, it passed a 
generalized law—the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—which applied 
the compelling interest test to “all Federal law, and the implementation of 
that law, whether statutory or otherwise.”241 This sort of system applies 
“blindly and en masse”242 and thus does not have the first advantage of 
statutory religious exemptions: identification of the proxy interest.243 
Because RFRA, and its “sister statute,” RLUIPA, protect religion in the 
broadest terms possible,244 it is not entirely clear what interest is actually 
 
 
of the statute” because there is nothing to indicate that “Congress affirmatively wanted to privilege 
religious exercise to the exclusion of other conscientious practices”).  
 237. This explains why much of Center for Inquiry’s reasoning was based on arguments involving 
other paradigmatic religions, such as Buddhism, rather than the Secular Humanists directly. See also 
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2014) (comparing the 
Indiana statute with one that permits Catholics but not Baptists from solemnizing weddings). Promotion 
of a particular religion is a much clearer violation of the Establishment Clause than promotion of religion 
in general. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to laws that 
“discriminate among religions,” but the lower scrutiny Lemon tests to laws “affording a uniform benefit 
to all religions”). The equal protection method, as I have framed it, seeks to blur the line between these 
two questions based on the impossibility of adequately defining religion, such that denying a benefit to 
a claimant because they are ostensibly non-religious is discriminating among religions. 
 238. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
 239. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (explicitly permitting “a nondiscriminatory 
religious-practice exemption,” but requiring that it be left “to the political process”). 
 240. See RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1) (2012) (declaring the purpose of RFRA to be “to 
restore the compelling interest test” that Congress found to have been “virtually eliminated” in Smith); 
see also Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2000 (Nov. 
16, 1993) (invoking “[t]he power to reverse . . . by legislation, a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court” and claiming that “this act reverses the Supreme Court’s decision Employment Division against 
Smith”). 
 241. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a). 
 242. Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 11 (1998) (emphasis omitted). But see Volokh, supra note 142, at 1491 (“Nothing in 
either the relationship of the three branches of government . . . or in the Establishment Clause stands in 
the way of this sort of delegation.”). 
 243. Instead, this system acts only as a general proxy for many interests. See supra note 161 for 
Professor Koppelman’s examples of such interests. The fact that this list of interests is undefined in 
scope is the precise advantage of the proxy from the point of view of protecting religious liberty. 
 244. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015) (“RLUIPA and its sister statute, [RFRA] . . . provide 
very broad protections for religious liberty.”) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
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being protected.245 Religious motivation by itself cannot adequately provide 
that interest.246 This creates a problem for the equal protection method: 
when there is no particular interest, there is nothing towards which a 
claimant can be similarly situated; instead we will end up asking whether a 
party is “‘generally’ similar” to a religious claimant,247 bringing us right 
back to the dangerous, misguided, and ultimately impossible task of 
defining religion. 
Though the second advantage of statutory religious exemption—the 
ability to use constitutional avoidance—remains,248 if we were to allow 
strict scrutiny for any claimant that has a belief that is similarly situated to 
any plausible religious belief we would have actual anarchy.249 The only 
proper way to apply RFRA and RLUIPA under the equal protection method 
cannot enable an admittedly non-religious claimant to create a particular 
accommodation through the statutory remedies.250 Such a possibility would 
be even more absurdly expansive than the two statutes already are.251 
Instead, the method should treat a pre-existing paradigmatic religious 
objector’s RFRA accommodation as if it were a particularized statutory 
 
 
2760 (2014)). 
 245. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 270 (criticizing RLUIPA’s “broad sweep, which 
gives every church (powerful, mainstream ones along with upstart outsiders) a presumptive exemption 
from every land use restriction . . . [including] ones that limit churches’ ability to expand parking lots, 
build on wetlands or in green belts, erect broadcasting antennas, and so on”). 
 246. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1510 (“Taken literally, such a claim is clearly too broad. Surely 
no court would immunize, for instance, murder or rape simply because the perpetrator acted out of 
religious conviction.”); accord Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Suppose one 
believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously 
contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”). 
 247. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 126 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-
5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). 
 248. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1493 (noting that “making the exemption available to anyone 
who has a deeply held conscientious belief” is equally available under “RFRA-type” regimes and 
statutory exemption regimes). 
 249. See Magarian, supra note 156, at 1986 (“The major disadvantage of this broad construction . . 
. is that a Federal RFRA construed to protect all manner of conscientious claims could shield masses of 
people from the reach of generally applicable laws.”). For instance, a business could argue that it is 
similarly situated in its “employment relationship based on an aversion to minimum wage” to a 
hypothetical religion. Or even a real one. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290 (1985) (involving a religious objection to minimum wage). Assuming sincerity, and ceteris paribus, 
there would be little reason to distinguish between such a business and the foundation. If one were 
granted accommodation (the actual foundation was not), both should be. 
 250. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“[O]f course, a prisoner’s request for an 
accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation . . . .”). 
 251. I am of the personal opinion that RFRA enables courts to implement actual policy and create 
new systems to accommodate religious objections. See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 
630 (7th Cir. 2015) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (“RFRA may require the government to start over and 
‘creat[e] . . . entirely new programs’ . . . .”) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2781 (2014)).  
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exemption from the legal burden.252 This is consistent with how RFRA has 
been applied by the Supreme Court in practice.253 If one views March for 
Life as more similar to Hobby Lobby than to a church, then it is arguably 
exactly how equal protection applied in March for Life.254 This distinction 
narrows the scope of the equal protection method to only expanding existing 
rights,255 where it belongs, and keeps it squarely in the rational basis 
standard that justifies its existence.256 This low standard is required, rather 
than strict scrutiny, because a “nondiscriminatory religious-practice 
 
 
 252. See Magarian, supra note 156, at 1926−27 (summarizing the “super-amendment” view of 
Federal RFRA which treats RFRA as individually amending every law to which it is applied). 
 253. So far the Court has focused on expanding existing accommodations for similarly situated 
claimants, despite the fact that the least restrictive means test imposed by RFRA and RLUIPA is 
“broader” than even “the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997). See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 433 (2006) (comparing a requested exemption for religious use of hoasca to a regulatory exemption 
for religious use of peyote); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (reaching its conclusion based on the 
existence of the “already devised and implemented” system for accommodation); Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 860 
(discussing already existing “exemption for prisoners with medical needs”). Zubik, had it not been 
remanded essentially without decision, see Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 
15-105, 15-119, 15-191, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (May 16, 2016) (per curiam), may have changed this 
focus. Petitioners had claimed that the accommodation itself violated RFRA, though again, the 
petitioners framed their argument as an expansion of an existing accommodation—the accommodation 
for churches rather than for religious non-profits. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5–6, Zubik v. 
Burwell, No. 14-1418 (May 29, 2015). We will simply have to wait for the issue to return to the Court 
in the next few years, either through the cases remanded or in the countless similar cases winding their 
way through the federal courts, including of course March for Life and Real Alternatives. 
 254. If March for Life is more similar to a church, then the method simply expands an existing 
regulatory exemption. If it is more similar to Hobby Lobby, then it is taking the existing regulatory 
exemption for churches—which was expanded to closely held corporations through RFRA in Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751—and then expanding that exemption again to similarly situated non-religious 
corporations in March for Life. I would argue that the March is more similar to Hobby Lobby, if only 
because it is in the same broad class of claimants originally denied accommodation, see supra note 41. 
255. Cf. Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, No. 4:14-CV-3183, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48746, at *20 (D. Neb. Apr. 
12, 2016) (“The primary focus of Cavanaugh’s complaint . . . is that he is being discriminated against . . 
. . He says very little about how his exercise of [Pastafarianism] has been significantly burdened by that 
alleged discrimination.”). The court in Cavanaugh rejected the plaintiff’s claim as not constituting a 
religion. See id. at *19. Despite this similarity to Africa, Cavanaugh is a perfect example of a claimant 
who would not find any solace in the equal protection method and helpfully demonstrates the distinction 
between the equal protection method and a broadened definition of religion. Cavanaugh’s failure to 
identify a particularized situation in which he was being denied equal treatment, rather than a generalized 
feeling of ostracization, would mean that there is nothing for the equal protection method to compare 
against to determine whether he was similarly situated. 
 256. March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 126 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he equal protection 
clause does not impose on lawmakers a requirement of perfect parity . . . . Rational basis review . . . 
demands that agency line drawing, however inartful, rationally relate to its purported objective.”), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-5301 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015). Reading RFRA to allow non-religious claimants to 
create accommodations would essentially use rational basis review to trigger strict scrutiny review, an 
absurdity no matter how inartful one thinks the blind protection of religious motivation may be. This 
absurdity may, of course, be an extension of a more fundamental problem with the idea of a statute 
imposing a certain standard of review on courts. 
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exemption” is generally permitted and is often desirable.257  
C. Playing in the Joints: Permissible Religious Solicitude 
As all three courts recognized in approaching the equal protection 
method,258 the Supreme Court has been clear that there is generally “no 
reason to require that [religious] exemption come packaged with benefits to 
secular entities.”259 A legislature does not violate the Establishment Clause 
simply by creating an accommodation for religion; “there is room for play 
in the joints” between the minimum guarantee of the Free Exercise and the 
upper limit of the Establishment Clause.260  
In Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the Court upheld 
a broad statutory exemption for religious employers from the prohibition of 
employment discrimination on the basis of religion.261 The case involved 
the dismissal of an employee from his job as an engineer at a public gym 
run by the Mormon Church for his failure to properly receive certification 
of his status as a Mormon.262 The Court validated the statutory 
accommodation even in this arguably non-religious context as permissible 
congressional recognition of “the ability of religious organizations to define 
and carry out their religious missions.”263 The Court also explicitly rejected 
strict scrutiny under equal protection for laws that uniformly benefit all 
religions vis-à-vis secular entities.264 More recently in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, the Court expanded on this 
understanding and held that “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government 
from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its 
 
 
 257. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 258. See March for Life, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 127 n.8; Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court 
Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2014); Real Alts., Inc. v. Burwell, 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 442–43  (M.D. 
Penn. 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-01275 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 259. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 338 (1987). 
 260. Walz v. Tax Comm’r of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). An upcoming case next term, 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) (granting certiorari), will further 
explore this room for play, but from the opposite direction (a church fighting against Missouri’s more 
stringent Establishment Clause) and with an explicit equal protection claim involved. See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 28–32, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, No. 15-577 (Nov. 4, 
2015). Though the Court will likely decide the case strictly on First Amendment grounds, there is 
certainly room for the Court to expand on the intersection between equal protection and the First 
Amendment that is the basis for this Note. 
 261. Amos, 483 U.S. at 329−30. 
 262. Id. at 330. 
 263. Id. at 339. See also id. (“The statute . . . avoids . . . intrusive inquiry into religious belief”). The 
district court had found that “none of [the employee’s] duties at the Gymnasium are ‘even tangentially 
related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual or the Mormon Church or church administration.’” 
Id. at 332. 
 264. Id. at 338−39. 
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ministers.”265 The purpose of this “ministerial exception” is to ensure that 
the “strictly ecclesiastical” issue of who should minister is decided solely 
on the church’s terms.266 
The reasoning in Amos and Hosanna-Tabor, despite focusing on the 
special nature of religion,267 not only coincides with the equal protection 
method but directly supports it. Both the Amos and Hosanna-Tabor 
holdings and the equal protection method are fundamentally based on the 
same thing—a desire to avoid the definitional game in Africa and Yoder and 
to focus instead on protecting the important underlying interest from such 
definitional attacks. The question whether a belief is religious can be just as 
dangerous as deciding an employee’s minister status or their relevance to a 
church’s religious mission and all should be treated similarly and removed 
from the equation.268 To the extent these rules discriminate, the rational 
basis for granting exemptions to religious groups over secular groups is 
based on aspects that are to some degree unique to religion.269 Such an 
accommodation does not irrationally rely on the religious motivation of a 
particular belief or action to justify it,270 but rather focuses on the nature of 
the religious group—on the accoutrements, as such. That right is not 
freedom of religion, in the absolute broadest sense, but rather freedom of 
the church.271 
It should, of course, be noted that shifting the focus to the church does 
not solve the problem of specialness.272 Furthermore, defining a church is 
just as difficult as defining a religion.273 However, unlike the broader 
 
 
 265. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012). 
 266. Id. at 709. See also id. at 710 (Thomas J., concurring) (“The question whether an employee is 
a minister is itself religious in nature . . . .”). 
 267. See id. at 706 (majority opinion) (finding “special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations” in the First Amendment). 
 268. Cf. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 5, at 809 (arguing that whether a claimant is religiously 
motivated or not “is entirely irrelevant to the administration of a well-formed regime of religious 
liberty”). 
 269. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 63 (describing the Catholic Church as a “structural 
anomaly” due to the “amalgam” of functions that priests serve, thus justifying a stricter freedom of 
association). 
 270. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1512 (“The communicative reasons for your actions . . . 
generally can’t justify the noncommunicative harms that the actions may inflict on me. Likewise, the 
religious reasons for your actions can’t, by themselves, justify harms to others.”). 
 271. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. 
CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 335, 336 n.2 (2013) (compiling post-Hosanna-Tabor discussions on freedom of 
the church). 
 272. See id. at 340–41 (“These conceptual challenges do not disappear simply by shifting the locus 
of the inquiry from ‘religion’ to ‘church.’”). 
 273. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 
917, 954 (2013) (“[T]here seem to be no good or even generalizable criteria for determining which 
institutions count [as churches] and which do not.”). 
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concept of religion,274 the freedom of the church, much like a statutory 
exemption, has a relatively narrow underlying interest: expressive and 
institutional freedom.275 This interest is protected for non-religious 
individuals by the freedom of association approximately to the degree the 
association is similarly situated to a church.276 Certainly, insofar as a secular 
group such as the Center for Inquiry is similarly situated in regards to having 
a “minister,” the holding in Hosanna-Tabor seems to counsel against 
interference regardless of the group’s religious status.277 For a group that is 
less like a religion, but with a similar expressive interest in choosing its 
leaders and its mission, there is the freedom of association as a bare claim.278 
Other non-religious groups are simply not similarly situated in regards to 
the interest.279  
Besides the employment cases, there is one other major case discussing 
the permissible preference for religion: Cutter v. Wilkinson,280 in which the 
Court held that RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause by 
impermissibly benefitting religion over secular interests.281 The Court 
 
 
 274. See supra note 167. 
 275. See generally Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 273 (discussing different views of 
religious institutionalism and church autonomy as an expressive association). Schragger and 
Schwartzman spend most of their article criticizing the “jurisdictional” view of religious 
institutionalism. This view is considerably broader than both of these associational interests and the 
Court’s holdings in Hosanna-Tabor and Amos. To the extent that this view is a true understanding of 
the freedom of the church, it would push towards a true libertarian freedom of association in order to 
fulfill the goals of the equal protection method. Again, generally speaking, allowing such a strong 
freedom-right has identical costs regardless of who is exercising the freedom, religious or otherwise, and 
thus under such a regime, I would have to extend this theory to an almost insurmountable right to 
expressive association. To whatever extent there is a bad result, there is just as much so without an 
extension. 
 276. That is not to say that the freedom of association and the freedom of the church are 
coterminous. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy 
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007); Tebbe, supra note 113, at 1144–47 (criticizing 
Eisgruber and Sager for falsely equating freedom of association and freedom of the church). The equal 
protection method is also less than equivalent to the stronger religious protections of the pre-Smith Free 
Exercise Clause or RFRA. Again, it should be noted that there is room for religious accommodation; the 
equal protection method seeks only to prevent strictly limiting the accommodation to the religious when 
a non-religious claimant is identically situated.  
 277. See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Hosanna-Tabor to further question the validity of the Indiana statute’s exception for clergy).  
 278. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (finding that the Boy Scouts could not be 
required to employ a homosexual scoutmaster because of the freedom of association interest in selecting 
the organization’s expressive leaders). 
 279. Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 13, at 239 (finding it “hard to see what would count” as 
a secular analogue to a minister and hypothesizing “a cultural group that wants guidance from certain 
‘elders’”); id. at 249 (supporting Amos and the Title VII exemption on the grounds that “there is no 
comparable reason for, say, McDonald’s to scrutinize the religious beliefs of its short-order cooks”). 
 280. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 281. Id. at 724 (“[RLUIPA] confers no privileged status on any particular religious sect, and singles 
out no bona fide faith for disadvantageous treatment.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
2016] THE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE 37 
 
 
 
 
attempted to defuse the fears of the Sixth Circuit that an irreligious prisoner 
who had his white supremacist literature confiscated would get rational-
relationship review whereas a member of the Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian would get RLUIPA’s compelling interest standard.282 The Court 
did so by noting that both hypothetical claimants would have their request 
rejected due to the “countervailing compelling interest in not facilitating 
inflammatory racist activity.”283 This easy case, however, misidentifies and 
ultimately dodges the problem: the benefit to religion is not the right to keep 
the literature, necessarily; rather it is receiving the higher standard of 
review, regardless of the result.284 A non-religious claimant that is similarly 
situated to a religious party that would receive accommodation is 
necessarily a more difficult case to justify with such an argument.285 The 
better solution to the Sixth Circuit’s problem is to deny the right of the non-
religious to that higher burden, as both courts did in Cutter, but nevertheless 
grant the similarly situated irreligious person access to the resulting 
accommodation if it should exist—exactly as the equal protection method 
does. 
D. A Similar Place: Equal Protection by Another Name 
Despite the Court’s general rejection of the principle, it has provided 
some support for the equal protection method. As Professor Koppelman 
identified,286 in the only situation in which non-religious parties actually 
made it to the Supreme Court with a request for use of a religious 
 
 
 282. Id. at 723 n.11. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Whether the 
Church would actually prevail under the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal 
weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.”). But see McConnell, supra note 14, at 7–8 (criticizing 
Justice Stevens’ argument and claiming that a museum or art gallery owned by either an atheist or a 
Catholic, Buddhist, or Jew would not receive accommodation under RFRA because owning a museum 
is not religious exercise). When the principle of Amos is combined with that of Cutter, we see the flaw 
here: religious individuals are specifically protected from the question whether the art gallery, like the 
gym in Amos, is or is not a part of their religious mission and thus the individuals do not receive equal 
treatment in the end. 
 285. Professors Eisgruber and Sager like to make a similar point with an example using instead the 
“LU” of RLUIPA. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 5, at 807–08 (providing an illustration of two 
women named Ms. Campbell, one religious and the other not, both of whom own soup kitchens and 
noting that, hypothetically, only the first can claim RLUIPA’s protection from zoning laws closing her 
kitchen). Like the decision in Amos, this example relies on the dangers of defining the respective Ms. 
Campbells’ religious missions. See id. at 823–24 (“Suppose it is clear that she is religious and that 
religion requires her to care for the poor. Does it require her to operate a soup kitchen, or does she have 
other choices?”). 
 286. Koppelman, supra note 10, at 78 (arguing that “the only examples” of comparable secular 
claims, the selective draft cases, were “resolved by deeming the objectors to be ‘religious’ in the 
pertinent sense”). 
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accommodation, that request was granted.287 The accommodation at issue 
was the exemption from the Vietnam War draft for conscientious objectors, 
a statute that, by its own terms, applied to a group even narrower than the 
“religious.”288 The method by which the Court chose to extend the 
accommodation was remarkably similar to that of the equal protection 
method in all of the details discussed over the course of this Note. 
In the first case, United States v. Seeger,289 the lead claimant, Seeger, 
based his objection to war on “such personages as Plato, Aristotle and 
Spinoza” and argued that his moral integrity existed “without belief in God, 
except in the remotest sense.”290 The Court was intimately aware of the 
complexity of the issue of defining religion: “[I]n no field of human 
endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the 
communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions 
of man’s predicament in life, in death or in final judgement and 
retribution.”291 Ultimately it decided that the test to define religion for the 
purposes of the statute was whether a belief “occupies in the life of its 
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly 
qualifying.”292 Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion, like the Center for 
Inquiry court, noted the statute’s effect on paradigmatic religions in 
supporting its extension to the less-clear Seeger.293 The Court was quite 
open about the fact that this broad construction was an effort of 
constitutional avoidance, intended to “avoid[] imputing to Congress an 
intent to classify different religious beliefs.”294  
The limits of this construction were tested only five years later in Welsh 
v. United States.295 The problem: Welsh was “far more insistent and explicit 
 
 
 287. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965). 
 288. 50 U.S.C. App’x § 456(j) (2012) (granting conscientious objector status to “any person . . . 
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form”). “Religious training and belief” is defined to explicitly exclude “essentially political, 
sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.” Id. At the time of these cases, 
exemption also required “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those 
arising from any human relation.” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
 289. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 290. Id. at 166. But see id. at 173 (“No party claims to be an atheist or attacks the statute on this 
ground.”). 
 291. Id. at 174. 
 292. Id. at 176. 
 293. Id. at 189–91 (Douglas, J. concurring) (using Hinduism and Buddhism to illustrate the “fluidity 
and evanescent scope” of the concept of a Supreme Being in religion).  
 294. Id. at 176 (majority opinion). See also id. at 192 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I would attribute 
tolerance and sophistication to the Congress, commensurate with the religious complexion of our 
communities.”). 
 295. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
2016] THE RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE 39 
 
 
 
 
than Seeger in denying that his views were religious.”296 Because of this, 
four of the eight Justices deciding the case agreed with the lower court and 
found the statute did not cover Welsh when he claimed conscientious 
objection without a religious basis.297 However, five Justices found Welsh 
entitled to objector status.298 Justice Harlan, writing alone, argued that to 
hold otherwise would violate the Establishment Clause by impermissibly 
privileging religious beliefs.299 The plurality continued to base its holding 
on constitutional avoidance, expanding the statute as in Seeger to include 
any beliefs that “play the role of a religion and function as a religion in the 
registrant’s life.”300 Predating March for Life by forty-five years, the 
Supreme Court asked whether Welsh’s beliefs were similarly situated to a 
belief in a Supreme Being and determined that they were.301 Decided only 
two years prior to Yoder, Welsh, with its predecessor, Seeger, lends 
significant support not only to the equal protection method as a concept but 
also to the underlying distinction between constitutional and statutory 
religious accommodation that supports it. In the end it seems that Judge 
Adams was absolutely correct in the epigraph quote: the First Amendment 
has never been interpreted to cover non-religious ideologies. But statutes 
have been and so they should be. 
CONCLUSION 
Religion is an important part of American life; it is the first right 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and as such it has received special treatment 
throughout our country’s history. In a situation unfortunate for the religious 
 
 
 296. Id. at 341. Seeger had put quotation marks around the word “religious”; Welsh had actually 
crossed the word out. Id. 
 297. See id. at 347 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is apparent . . .that the words of this section, as 
used and understood by Congress, fall short of enacting the broad policy of exempting from military 
service all individuals who in good faith oppose all war.”); id. at 368 (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is 
contrary to the express will of Congress to exempt Welsh . . . .”). Justice Blackmun took no part in the 
case, making this a 4-4 decision on this narrow issue. 
 298. Id. at 341 (plurality opinion) (finding Welsh to be religious and that relying on his explicit 
denial “places undue emphasis on the registrant’s interpretation of his own beliefs”); id. at 361–62 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (concurring on Establishment Clause grounds).  
 299. See id. at 362. In Justice Harlan’s mind, that approach requires an “equal protection mode of 
analysis.” Id. at 357. 
 300. Id. at 339 (plurality opinion). 
 301. The only disadvantage of the Welsh version of this test is that it seeks to expand the concept of 
religion to capture the admittedly non-religious rather than simply recognizing that the label is irrelevant 
to whether the claimant is similarly situated. This of course opens the way to the “common-sense” attack 
discussed supra note 182, as indicated by Justice Harlan’s vitriol at the plurality’s “lobotomy” of an 
interpretation, Welsh, 398 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). The equal protection method follows 
Harlan’s position more closely than the majority for that reason, but they are still remarkably similar 
methods that reached the same result in this case, and would do so in most other cases. 
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and non-religious alike, there is not always much that is distinct about 
religion to justify this special treatment. At best, religion is an imperfect 
proxy for some broad array of more fundamental interests. Some people, 
such as the plaintiffs in March for Life and Center for Inquiry, find 
themselves in an identical position in relation to those interests as religious 
individuals, but unable to claim the privileged treatment granted by statute 
only to those beliefs that can carry the mantle. Often these people could 
reframe their beliefs as religious without impeachment, simply by claiming 
as such, but that only makes the problem worse: it gives exemptions to 
hypocrites and risks giving them to fraudsters, but denies the right to 
sincere, honest, non-religious individuals. There is simply no reason for this 
arbitrary distinction. Insofar as the religious and non-religious are similarly 
situated as to that underlying interest, they should both be granted an 
exemption from the law that infringes upon that interest. That is exactly 
what has been done in the Seventh Circuit, and now in the District of 
Columbia, and exactly what was done forty-five years ago by the Supreme 
Court.  
Through this equal protection method, the rights of the non-religious 
have been recognized and the rights of the religious have been further 
cemented in their legitimacy and security. This analysis bridges the gap 
between esoteric legal theory and the actual practices of our Congress, 
Executive, and Judiciary. Building on decades-old precedents and newly 
minted case law, it recognizes the dangers inherent in a narrow, judicially-
imposed definition of religion, but avoids the nonsense that results from a 
broad, amorphous one. By its incremental scope, it corrects the Legislature 
without ever chastising it and slides inoffensively into the mechanisms by 
which religious freedom is protected, without modifying or invalidating 
them. Ultimately this is a small step for freedom, whether religious or non-
religious, but it is an important step for both. 
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